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BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) Utah Code Annotated, as amended and now in 
effect, and pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, 
ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1. Does the final decision in the prior action 
(District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, Civil No. C-89-3339) 
between the same parties bar Appellees' claims in this action on 
grounds of res judicata? 
Standard of Review; A grant of summary judgment is 
mandated where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party (Appellee in this matter) is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Reeves v. Geioy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 
636, 642 (Utah 1988), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 
317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In deciding 
whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment, the 
appellate court shall review the same for correctness and gives 
no deference to the trial court's view of the law. Utah State 
Coal, of Sr. Citizens v. UP&L, 776 P.2d 632 (Utah 1989). Neither 
will the appellate court give deference to the lower court's 
legal conclusions concerning whether material facts are in 
dispute. Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821r 825 
(Utah App. 1989) . 
ISSUE 2. Is the judgment of the District Court in the 
prior action subject to attack by decision of the Circuit Court? 
Standard of Review: Same as in Issue 1 above. 
ISSUE 3. Were the Appellant's obligations under the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract which was the subject of the prior 
action in the District Court discharged by payment in full of the 
purchase price, thereby barring Appellees' claim for taxes, water 
assessment, attorney's fees, or interest in the subsequent action 
in the Circuit Court? 
Standard of Review: Same as in Issue 1 above. 
ISSUE 4. Did Appellants raise genuine issues of 
material fact regarding: 
(a) Whether the issue of payment of taxes and water 
assessments was excluded as an issue from the trial in 
the prior action in the District Court. 
(b) Whether the attorney's fees were reasonable, and 
whether the trial court could make that determination 
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on affidavit without a hearing and without a supporting 
finding of fact. 
Standard of Review: Same as in Issue 1 above. 
ISSUE 5. Did the Circuit Court err in denying 
Appellants' motion for summary judgment? 
Standard of Review; Same as in Issue 1 above. 
ISSUE 6. Were the issues raised by Appellants properly 
preserved below? 
Standard of Review; Issues not raised in the trial 
court cannot be considered on appeal. LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel 
Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 482-483 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Plaintiffs/Appellees, Robert 
H. Covington and Mary C. Whetman, as the co-personal 
representatives of the Estate of Douglas B. Covington (the 
"Covingtons"), brought this action in the court below in July, 
1992f seeking reimbursement for real property taxes and water 
assessments that they had paid in May of 1992 pursuant to the 
terms of a Uniform Real Estate Contract between 
Defendants/Appellants, John C. Josephson and Geraldine C. 
Josephson (the MJosephsonsM) as buyers, and Douglas B. Covington 
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and Alice H. Covington, as sellers (the "Contract"). The 
Josephsons raised only one defense, claiming that the Covingtons7 
were barred by res judicata, and citing the District Court's 
decision in a prior action between the same parties involving 
title to the Josephsons7 property, in Estate of Covington v. 
Josephson, Civ. No. C-89-3339, Dec. 18, 1991, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. The terms of the Contract are not in dispute. The 
Josephsons do not claim to have paid the taxes and assessments 
for which reimbursement is sought, but only to have paid all 
principal and interest due under the Contract. 
B. Course of Proceedings. The Covingtons filed an 
action in the Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
July 7, 1992. Both parties made motions for summary judgment, 
which were argued to the lower court. The Josephsons have 
appealed the lower court's decision in favor of the Covingtons 
and filed their brief with this Court. 
C. Disposition At Trial Court. Upon cross-motions 
for summary judgment by the Covingtons and the Josephsons, the 
court below granted summary judgment in favor of the Covingtons: 
(1) awarding damages in the amount of $3,370.70, plus costs of 
$141.40, attorney's fees of $3,127.50 and interest on the sum of 
$3,440.70 at the "contract rate of 3/4's of one percent per month 
from May 8, 1992, until date hereof" on the judgment and 
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F. On May 8, 1992, the Covingtons sold the Covington 
Property. 
G. On or about the date of sale of the Covington 
Property, the Covingtons paid the taxes due and owing on the 
Josephson property, in the amount of $3,377.15, and water 
assessments with regard to the Josephsons' water stock in the 
amount of $63.55. (See Affidavit of Mary C. Whetman). 
H. The Covingtons were required to pay the property 
taxes on their own property and on the Josephson Property in 
connection with the sale of the Covington Property because the 
parcels had been jointly assessed, and unless all taxes covered 
by the assessment were paid they could not have delivered clear 
title to the purchasers of their property. (See Affidavit of 
Mary C. Whetman). 
I. Although unknown to the Covingtons at the time, the 
Josephsons were part of the group which purchased the Covington 
Property. The Josephsons did not at the time of that purchase, 
nor have they since, objected to the Covington's payment of the 
taxes and assessments on their property. (See Affidavit of Mary 
C• Whetman)• 
J. In May of 1989, the Covingtons commenced a suit 
against the Josephsons in the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, Case No. C-89-3339, seeking a declaration that the 
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Covington Property was not subject to a right-of-way in favor of 
the Josephsons, for damages for slander of title and trespass, 
and for an injunction restraining the Josephsons from continuing 
to use the right-of-way. The Josephsons counterelaimed against 
the Covingtons asking the Court to quiet title in them to a 
right-of-way across a portion of the Covington Property, award 
them five shares of water stock and declare that the Contract was 
"fully paid and performed by Josephsons, and Josephsons are 
entitled to conveyance" of the Josephson Property. (See 
Complaint and Answer and Counterclaim attached as Addendum 
Exhibits "C" and "D"). 
K. The Covingtons filed a Reply to the Counterclaim. 
They denied, on information and belief, "that the [Josephsons] 
have performed said obligations" under the Contract, and admitted 
that, upon full performance, Josephsons would be entitled to a 
conveyance under the Contract of the Josephson Property, but 
without the right-of-way. [See Reply attached as Addendum 
Exhibit "E"). 
L. The District Court case was tried to the Court 
without a jury, Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding, in June 
1991, and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment were 
ultimately entered on December 18, 1991, quieting title in the 
Josephsons to the Josephson Property, recognizing the claimed 
-8-
right-of-way, and awarding $4,000 attorney fees. (See District 
Court Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "F"). 
M. The judgment in the District Court case did not 
address the issue of taxes and assessments paid on the Josephson 
Property by the Covingtons. Rather, the claims and subsequent 
determination of the District Court case focused solely on the 
existence and use of the right-of-way in question. (See 
District Court Judgment). 
N. On several occasions prior to the District Court 
trial regarding the right-of-way, and on at least one occasion 
during the trial, the Josephsons' attorney, Mr. Robert Cummings, 
represented to the Covingtons' attorney and to the Court that the 
Josephsons would pay any taxes and water assessments which were 
due on their parcel. He stated to the Court (and the Covingtons 
and their counsel agreed) that the case before the Court was to 
determine the existence of the right-of-way. No issue or 
question regarding payments under the Contract arose, as the 
Covingtons acknowledged that no further amounts were then owed to 
them under the Contract. Neither side presented evidence at the 
trial regarding any taxes or water assessments owed on the 
Josephsons' property. In fact, the Josephsons presented no 
evidence at the trial, since the Josephsons' motion for a nonsuit 
was granted at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case. (See 
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Affidavit of Mary Whetman, Affidavit of David K. Broadbent 
attached as Addendum Exhibit "G% and District Court Judgment). 
0. After paying the taxes and assessments jointly 
assessed against the Covington Property and the Josephson 
Property, the Covingtons made repeated demands upon the 
Josephsons for reimbursement of the Josephsons, share of the 
taxes and assessments. (See Affidavit of David K. Broadbent 
attached as Addendum Exhibit "G"). The Josephsons refused and 
failed to repay such amounts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. Issues II, III, and IV raised by the 
Josephsons were not presented to the court below and are 
therefore not properly before this Court pursuant to LeBaron & 
Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 482-483 (Utah 1991). 
POINT II. The Covingtons' claim for repayment of taxes 
and assessments is not barred by res judicata inasmuch as it is 
neither the same claim nor cause of action made in the prior case 
between the parties, and is not barred by collateral estoppel 
because it does not involve the same issues as the prior case. 
POINT III. The Uniform Real Estate Contract upon which 
Covingtons' claim is based clearly required the Josephsons to pay 
taxes and assessments and obligated them to reimburse the 
Covingtons should the Covingtons pay them. The Covingtons were 
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required to pay the Josephsons7 taxes and assessments because 
they were also assessed against the Covington property under a 
joint assessment, and the Josephsons have failed to reimburse the 
Covingtons for the amounts so paid. 
POINT IV. The Josephsons7 payment of principal and 
interest under the Contract does not relieve them of their 
separate obligation to pay taxes and assessments against their 
property. The Covingtons are entitled to reimbursement of taxes 
and assessments paid on the Josephsons7 property, even though 
they paid them after the purchase price under the Contract was 
paid. 
POINT V. No material issues exist which would 
preclude summary judgment. The Josephsons have not denied that 
the Covingtons paid the taxes and assessments which are the 
subject of this action, and have not claimed to have reimbursed 
the amounts demanded of them. 
POINT VI. The Affidavit of Attorneys Fees submitted to 
the trial court met the requirements established by the Code of 
Judicial Administration and by applicable case law. In addition, 
the Josephsons7 failure to object to the Affidavit or otherwise 
to the reasonableness of the Covingtons7 attorneys fees precludes 
their belated objection on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. OTHER THAN ISSUES 1 AND 5, THE JOSEPHSONS' 
ISSUES ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, AS THE JOSEPHSONS DID 
NOT PRESERVE THEM IN THE LOWER COURT. 
On appeal, the Josephsons raise five separate issues, 
only two of which were raised in the court below, namely, 
Appellants' Issues I and V. Because the Josephsons did not raise 
the additional issues prior to this time, such issues are not now 
properly before this Court on appeal. LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel 
Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 482-483 (Utah 1991). As noted in 
LeBaron, in order to preserve a substantive issue on appeal, a 
party must bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, 
"thus providing an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits." 
LeBaron at 483. Failure to do so precludes the appellate court 
from considering their merits on appeal. Id. Accordingly, 
Issues II through IV are not within the scope of the appeal to 
this Court. 
POINT II. THE COVINGTONS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
The Covingtons' claim for reimbursement of taxes and 
assessments paid by them under the terms of the Contract is 
properly raised in this suit. The Covingtons' claims were not, 
and could not have been, addressed in the prior District Court 
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litigation between the parties, because the cause of action 
asserted in this case did not arise until after the District 
Court action was decided. In the prior case, the Covingtons 
sought to prevent the Josephsons' use of an alleged right-of-way 
located on the Covington Property, and the Josephsons sought to 
establish their claim to the right-of-way. After the conclusion 
of the Covingtons' case in chief, the District Court granted 
Josephsons' motion for nonsuit and entered judgment in favor of 
the Josephsons. No claims were made nor evidence presented 
regarding taxes and assessments, nor, for that matter, regarding 
other payments under the Contract. [Judgment, R. 25]. The 
District Court's Judgment identified the nature of the litigation 
before it, in stating that "plaintiffs are not entitled to relief 
on their Complaint" and that "defendants are entitled to the 
right-of-way . . . ." [District Court Judgment, R. 26]. The 
Covingtons' complaint had not requested any payments under the 
Contract nor alleged that any were due. The Covingtons did not 
dispute the Josephsons' claim that they had paid all amounts owed 
to the Covingtons under the Contract, and had no claim against 
the Josephsons until they were forced to pay the taxes and 
assessments in order to sell their remaining property. Except 
for the fact that the Josephsons' Property was jointly assessed 
with their own property, the Covingtons were not concerned with 
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the Josephsons' payment of taxes. The Covingtons had no reason 
to pay the Josephsons' share of the taxes until they were engaged 
in the sale of their own property, and then only because they had 
to pay the taxes in order to deliver clear title to their 
purchasers. [R. 72] Had it not been for the sale of their 
property, the Covingtons could have waited for the County to 
assess the Covington Property and the Josephson Property 
separately . 
A claim of res judicata does not deliver the windfall 
sought by the Josephsons. As explained by the Supreme Court in 
Schaer v. State By & Through Dept. of Transportation. 657 P.2d 
1337 (Utah 1983) , res judicata requires the same cause of action, 
claim or demand. Id. at 1340. The prior litigation in Schaer 
was a condemnation action in which the plaintiff/landowner had 
contended that he was entitled to severance damages because his 
remaining property was effectively landlocked as a result of the 
condemnation. The findings of fact included a finding that the 
condemnation resulted in no reasonable access to the plaintiff's 
remaining property. In the subsequent litigation, the landowner 
requested a ruling that a Mdugway road", which could have 
provided access to his property, had become a public thoroughfare 
and was therefore available for access suitable for residential 
development. In opposing the landowner's motion for summary 
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judgment and in arguing for summary judgment in its favor, the 
State argued that the plaintiff was precluded from maintaining 
his claim by operation of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
In the Schaer case, the Supreme Court rejected the res judicata 
defense. The Court grounded its holding in reasoning that res 
judicata is inapplicable where the two cases rested on a 
different state of facts, where evidence of a different kind or 
character was necessary to sustain the two cases, and where the 
two claims related to different time periods. 
Here, as in Schaer, the parties' claims and causes of 
action are quite distinct. The Covingtons' claims for relief in 
the District Court action were to quiet title to the disputed 
right-of-way, and were not to recover for payment of taxes and 
assessments. The Josephsons' counterclaim sought conveyance of 
the Josephson Property, including the disputed right-of-way. In 
contrast, the matter now before this Court is limited to a 
distinct claim and facts which arose well after the District 
Court litigation was concluded. Almost a year after the 
District Court trial, and several months after the final judgment 
in that case was entered, the Covingtons paid real property taxes 
and water assessments which were jointly assessed against their 
property and the Josephson Property. [R. 72] The Covingtons then 
brought this action for reimbursement of the amounts they had 
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paid after the Josephsons refused to reimburse the payments made 
on their behalf. The Covingtons' claim was not ripe until after 
the prior action had been terminated. Under the terms of 
paragraph 14 of the Contract, they were not entitled to 
reimbursement until after they had made payment themselves and 
then made demand upon the Josephsons• 
Furthermore, the Covingtons' claims do not raise issues 
which are identical to those litigated in their prior case 
against the Josephsons. Their current claims are not, therefore, 
barred by the principles of collateral estoppel. 
The Supreme Court and this Court have identified the 
four-part test to be used in determining whether application of 
collateral estoppel is appropriate. In Schaer, supra, the 
Supreme Court identified the four elements as: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
identical with the one presented in the action in 
question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, fully, 
and fairly litigated? 
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In articulating the four elements of collateral estoppel in 
Mackintosh v. Hampshire, 832 P.2d 1298 (Utah App. 1992) this 
Court substituted the word "completely" for "competently" in 
stating the fourth element. If any one of the elements is not 
satisfied, then the issue may be litigated, and is not barred. 
In Schaer, supra. the Supreme Court analyzed the 
defendant's collateral estoppel challenge after holding that the 
plaintiff's claims survived defendant's res judicata attack. 
There, as in the case before this Court, the focus was on whether 
the first and fourth tests - identity of the issues and full and 
fair litigation - were satisfied. In determining whether the 
issue decided in the previous action was identical to that tried 
in the subsequent action, the Supreme Court articulated the 
standard that the issues actually litigated in the first action 
must be "precisely the same as those raised in the [subsequent] 
action." Id. at 1341. In Schaer, the earlier litigation was a 
condemnation action which focused on whether the plaintiff's 
remaining property was effectively landlocked. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that the identity of issues necessary to support a 
finding of collateral estoppel was not present in the subsequent 
action. "Despite vague and indirect references to the dugway 
road, [the prior litigation] had not focused on the precise issue 
of whether the dugway road was a public thoroughfare" under the 
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applicable statute. Id. at 1341. The Court observed that the 
findings of fact in the prior case, even though stating that no 
reasonable access existed, did not purport to rule conclusively 
on the status of the dugway road "for all time." It further 
stated that "neither the findings nor the judgment entered [in 
the prior litigation] demonstrates that the court considered and 
ruled on the precise issue in this case, namely, whether the 
dugway road met the requirements of U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-80." 
Id. at 1341. 
Similarly, in the present case, the District Court's 
statement that the Contract had been "paid in full" did not speak 
to obligations of the Josephsons that had not yet arisen nor 
entitle them to avoid those obligations when they matured. 
Likewise, the defendants in Schaer presented no evidence to 
contest the facts presented in plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, but relied exclusively on the doctrines of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Schaer 
plaintiff, and this Court should do so here. 
Appellants' collateral estoppel claim is similar to the 
one rejected in Mackintosh, supra. The trial court in that case 
had determined that a claim was barred by collateral estoppel and 
granted summary judgment for defendants. On appeal, the Court of 
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Appeals reversed, basing its holding on defendant's failure to 
demonstrate adequate identity of the issues. Id. at 1301. In 
the first suit, Mackintosh was sued by a Utah limited partnership 
to quiet title in a particular tract of land, and for slander of 
title caused by a notice of interest he had filed against the 
tract. Mackintosh counterclaimed, asserting that he had a ten 
percent interest in the land due to an oral agreement with the 
partnership. His counterclaim was dismissed because the oral 
agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. In the 
second suit, however, Mackintosh claimed he had "an agreement for 
monetary compensation" with the partnership, not "an agreement 
for an interest in real property." Id. at 1301. The Court of 
Appeals determined that the second suit's claim was not barred 
because Mackintosh had raised different issues in his second 
suit, even though the later claims were based on the same oral 
agreement. 
The Covingtons are in an even better position than 
Mackintosh, inasmuch as their claims did not arise until after 
the first suit was over. In Mackintosh, however, the plaintiff's 
claim for compensation under the oral agreement could have been 
raised in the first lawsuit, but was not. 
Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.. 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 
1981), demonstrates that the standard of "precision" necessary 
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for issue identity is very high, and that Courts will closely 
scrutinize the issues. In Wilde, insureds brought an action 
against their no-fault insurer for additional no-fault benefits 
for lost wages and household services. The Supreme Court found 
that the issue of lost wages had been litigated in an earlier 
action against the third-party tort feasor, but that issues 
regarding plaintiff's disability may not have been. Accordingly, 
the insureds were collaterally estopped from relitigating the 
lost wages issue, but not the question of their disability. 
The Josephsons' claim also fails to meet the fourth 
element of collateral estoppel, that the issue in the first case 
be completely, competently, fully and fairly litigated. As 
stated in the uncontroverted affidavits of Mary Whetman and David 
K. Broadbent, no argument or evidence was presented in the first 
case regarding any amounts owing under the contract, whether for 
principal, interest, or otherwise, and certainly not about taxes 
or assessments. [R. 63, 72] The parties acknowledged that their 
dispute was about the right-of-way, and that the sole issue was 
whether it had to be included in the conveyance of the Josephson 
Property. Accordingly, it cannot be said the issue of payment of 
taxes and assessments was litigated at all, let alone fully, 
fairly and completely or competently. 
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As in the Mackintosh case, the initial litigation 
between the parties to this action addressed the parties' 
competing claims to real property, more particularly, a right-of-
way. Here, however, the Covingtons are seeking reimbursement, 
pursuant to the terms of the Contract, for tax and assessment 
payments made by them after the first case was concluded. 
While both actions involved the same Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, the first case focused on disputed interpretation and 
scope of the property to be conveyed under the contract, namely, 
whether it entitled the Josephsons to a right-of-way. The 
present case involves no real property interests, nor issues of 
interpretation of the Contract, but simply the Josephson's 
obligation to reimburse the Covingtons for taxes and assessments, 
an indebtedness which would be undisputed but for the Josephsons7 
claims of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
In summary, the defenses of res judicata or collateral 
estoppel are illusory. No claims for payments of any nature or 
amount were made in the prior action, and no issues arose 
regarding such matters. In fact, the District Court would have 
committed obvious error if it had determined that the Covingtons 
were owed reimbursement for taxes or assessments, since they had 
not yet paid the taxes and assessments sought here. 
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POINT III. THE CONTRACT UNAMBIGUOUSLY ENTITLES THE 
COVINGTONS TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS WHICH THEY 
PAID. 
In clear and unmistakable terms, the Contract obligated 
the Josephsons to "pay all taxes and assessments of every kind 
and nature" which were or which might become due on the Property. 
Further, if the Covingtons paid taxes and assessments on the 
Josephson Property upon the Josephsons' failure to do so, the 
Josephsons agreed to *repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums 
so advanced and paid, . . . together with interest thereon from 
date of payment . . . ." As yet, the Josephsons have failed to 
make any such repayment notwithstanding the Covingtons' demand. 
POINT IV. PAYMENT OF THE PURCHASE PRICE UNDER THE 
CONTRACT DOES NOT RELIEVE THE JOSEPHSONS FROM THEIR OBLIGATION TO 
PAY THE TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS ALSO DUE UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
In Point III of Appellants' Brief, the Josephsons 
assert that payment in full of the principal and interest due 
under Contract means that the Contract has been terminated and 
that no claim for reimbursement can be made thereunder. Because 
the Josephsons did not raise this issue below, it was not 
preserved for appeal and is not now properly before this Court on 
appeal. LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 
482-483 (Utah 1991). 
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Moreover, a brief examination of the Josephsons' claim 
reveals its substantive deficiencies. In addition to principal 
and interest, the Josephsons had the obligation under the 
Contract to pay the taxes and assessments in question. The 
obligation was separate and distinct from their obligation to pay 
the purchase price under the Contract, and, under the express 
terms of the Contract, the Covingtons' claim for reimbursement 
did not mature until they had actually paid the taxes and 
assessments. The Affidavit submitted by John Josephson in 
opposition to Covington's motion for summary judgment, and the 
Draper Bank escrow record attached thereto, addressed only 
payments of principal and interest under the Contract. [R. 47] 
Neither the affidavit nor the escrow records mention the 
Josephsons' obligation to pay taxes and insurance, which from the 
inception of the Contract were handled outside of the Draper Bank 
escrow. While the purchase price required under the Contract 
may have been paid in full, the Josephsons were still required 
under the terms of the Contract to pay property taxes and 
assessments, either directly to the County and water company, or 
indirectly by reimbursing the Covingtons following their payment 
of these items. Notwithstanding the technical arguments to the 
contrary, the simple fact remains that the Josephsons failed to 
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make the required payments; and the Covingtons were forced to pay 
them in order to sell their property. 
BLT Investment Company v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 
1978), cited by the Josephsons, is inapposite. That case 
discusses the legal effect of rescission, stating that the effect 
of rescission is as though the contract "never had any 
existence.M Id. at 458. That case clearly does not apply to 
this action. The Contract was neither rescinded nor terminated. 
To the contrary, it was the very viability of the Contract that 
both parties relied on to resolve the prior District Court case 
and is the basis of this action. 
POINT V. THE COVINGTONS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, AS NO MATERIAL FACTUAL ISSUE EXISTS. 
The Josephsons argue that the affidavits of the parties 
below raise factual issues which the court below should have 
tried. This claim is based on the assertion that the affidavit 
of John C. Josephson disputes the facts contained in the 
affidavits of Mary C. Whetman and David K. Broadbent. Mr. 
Josephson's affidavit is attached as Addendum Exhibit "H". 
Even viewing the contents of the Josephson affidavit in 
the light most favorable to the Josephsons, this assertion is 
unfounded. Mr. Josephson's statement that he fully performed his 
duties under the Contract, "as demonstrated by the attached 
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statement of Draper Bank," [R. 47] does not conflict with the 
affidavit of Mrs. Whetman regarding taxes and assessments, and 
goes only to the issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel, 
discussed above. Mr. Josephson's affidavit and the Draper Bank 
statement address only principal and interest due under the 
Contract, and not the taxes and assessments which are the subject 
of this dispute. [R. 47] Mr. Josephson has not claimed to have 
paid the taxes and assessments which are the subject of this 
action or disputed the fact that the Covingtons have paid them. 
The Broadbent and Whetman affidavits specifically address the 
Covingtons' payment of property taxes and assessments and the 
demands made for reimbursement therefor. [R. 63 and 72] They 
also state that no evidence was presented and no argument was 
made in the prior action in the District Court on the issue of 
payment of taxes or assessments. The Josephsons have not denied 
these material and relevant facts, but in fact asserted that no 
material facts were in issue when they moved and argued for 
summary judgment in their favor. [R. 39] 
POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
WAS PROPER. 
In Point IV of their argument, the Josephsons assert 
that the lower court's award of attorney's fees was improper, and 
cite Provo City Corporation v. Cropper, 497 P.2d 629 (Utah 1972). 
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That case simply states that the court is obligated to take 
evidence on the issue of the reasonableness of attorney's fees. 
In this case, evidence of attorney's fees was presented in the 
court below. Specifically, the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, 
dated January 21, 1993, and executed by counsel to the Covingtons 
constitutes such evidence. A copy of the Affidavit is attached 
hereto as Addendum Exhibit "I." The contents of that Affidavit 
comply with the express requirements of Rule 4-505 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. Accordingly, the lower court's award of 
attorney's fees was proper and is consistent with such Rule and 
with the Cropper case. See also LMV Leasing. Inc. v. Conlin, 805 
P.2d 189, 198 (Utah 1991). Moreover, the Josephsons made no 
objection to the Circuit Court regarding the amount of the fees 
or the adequacy of the affidavit submitted in support of those 
fees. Because the issue was not raised below, under LeBaron & 
Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises, 623 P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991), it 
should not be raised for the first time here. 
CONCLUSION 
The Covingtons are entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law because no genuine issue of material fact is in 
dispute before this Court or the Court below. This Court has 
stated that, H[t]he Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a 
'judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Kleinert v, 
Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah App. 1993) (cites 
omitted). In Kleinert. this Court also stated that M[a]fter a 
motion for summary judgment has been made . . ., the opposing 
party may not rest on mere allegation or denial." Id. This Court 
continued, "[t]he opposing party's response must set forth 
specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial." Id. 
The facts are undisputed that, following the court's 
decision in the prior District Court action, the Covingtons paid 
the property taxes and assessments on the Josephson Property upon 
Josephsons' failure to do so, and that the Josephsons refused to 
repay such taxes and assessment, as required under the Contract. 
Mr. Josephson's affidavit does not raise disputes about material 
facts. The court below, therefore, properly granted the 
Covingtons' motion for summary judgment. 
Based upon the facts and discussion set forth above, 
the Covingtons urge this Court to affirm the summary judgment 
granted by the Circuit Court, requiring the Josephsons to 
reimburse the amounts referred to in the lower court's decision. 
Under paragraph 21 of the Contract, and pursuant to Management 
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Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 
1980), the Covingtons are also entitled to their attorneys' fees 
incurred in this appeal, together with the unpaid accruing 
interest on the amounts due under the Contract and hereby request 
an award of those fees and interest. 
Respectfully submitted this / ( day of January, 1994. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZABLER 
.'Si /CC^J^^+^-4^' 
David K. Broadbent 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
 t£J 
I hereby certify that, on the / / day of January, 
1994, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to the 
following: 
Gordon A. Madsen, Esq. 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, UT 84054 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
c^tu^&u^j >J^aA^--
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit Page of Record 
"A" Contract 29 
"BM Affidavit of Mary C. Whetman 72 
"CH District Court Complaint1 
"D" District Court Answer and Counterclaim 
"EM District Court Reply to Counterclaim 
MF" District Court Judgment 25 
"G" Affidavit of David K. Broadbent 63 
"H" Affidavit of John C. Josephson 47 
"I" Affidavit of David K. Broadbent 95 
1
 The District Court Complaint, Counterclaim and Reply to 
Counterclaim were not included in the record below. Copies are 
included inasmuch as they were cited in Appellant's Brief to this 
Court, and in the Covingtons' response. 
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"THIS IS A L£GALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDfcRSTOOO. SEfc* C O M P E U N T ADVICE: 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this I l k . . aay of- M»V 1 9 7 3 , A. D.. 19. 
by and between DOUGLAS E , COVTNCTON AND ALICE H . COVINGTON a k a ALICE HANSEN COVINGTON 
hereinafter designated a, the Seller, and , „ J O " * C . JOS^PHSON AND CFRALDINE C , JOSEPHSCN, 
hi s w i fe , as int ten and not as ten in comnon, with f u l l r ights of survivorship, . , 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of S a l t L a K e C i t V » U t a h — 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
S a T t Lak» 
_, State of Utah, to-wit: the county of _ 
AOORCSS 
More particularly described as follows: 
BRG .at a point N 89°54'10" W 1320 f t fr th<? SE cor of Sec 35, T2S, 
R1E, SLBfcM and running th N Oc10*23" W 505.475 f t to a noint on an old barbed 
wire f e n c c l m e ; thence N 86°34'1C" W 265.41 f t ; th S 20°15» E 555,56? f t 
to th? S l i n e of said S ec 35; th along said S l i n e S 89°54 ,10" E 74.17 f t 
to point of beg , 
5 
TOGETHER WITH X shares of Bdg Willow Irrigation water stock. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of 
SIXTPSN THOUSAND PIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY AND N O / 1 0 0
 D o l l a r s , j t 6 , B 3 0 « 0 0 \ 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order _ TttAPER BANK MT> TRUST 
•trictly within the followine time.. w-»i«: THR^g THOUSAND ANP N O / 1 0 0 - - - > _ - ,T 3 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 } 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of t ! * shall be paid as follows: 
$107.00 or more per month commencing June 10, 1973 and monthly thereafter 
until principal balance together with accrued interest has been paid in full... 
Any payment that becomes 15 days or more delinquent shall be charged a $5.00 ' 
per month late charge. 
N«r. Covington shall retain use of bldgs on property for a period of 10 yearsM,i 
if desired. 
Buyer agrees to not hold seller liable for any future problems or litigation 
with regard to boundary line discrepancy between survey and existing fence line 
Seller agrees to assist buyer in any way possible to resolve problem* 
4 t h day of M*v 1 9 7 3 1&-Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the 
4. Said monthly pay menu are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from 5—4—73 on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of . a% . per cent ( 3 5 *?t \ per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime. 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made, 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract iess than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of 
none 
with an unpaid balance of 
aa of . 
7. Seller represent* that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop* 
erty, except the following . 
-no no 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed fi percent 
( 9r) per annum ami payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the agrregate monthly installment 
payment* required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller »gree* to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to mukc application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under ihe regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to nay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the p_ayment of his obligations against said property. EXHIBIT "A 
12 The Buver ajrree* to par the reneral taxes alter . S - A -
]3 The Bu*er further agree* to keep all insurable building* arid improvement* on aaid premiaes insured in a com 
pant acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not leu* than the unpaid balance on this contract or t . — H ' ? 
mnd to asojrn said insurance to the Seller an his interest* ros* appear and to deliver the insurance poiicv to him 
H In the event the Buver shaft default in the pa* men! of a m si**cial or general taxes assessment* or insuranre 
premiums as herein provided the Seller ma\ at hut option j**} naid tax en assessment* and insurance premiums or cither 
of tnem and if Seller elect* so to dt then the Huver agree* to w**\ tb» teller u?Km demand all such sums no advanced 
and paid M him together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of ^ of or\9 percent per 
month until paid 
15 Hu\er agrees that he «i l l not commit or suffer to he committed anv waste spoil or destruction in or upon 
said premises and that he will maintain said premises in jrood condition 
K li the event of a failure to romph with the terms hereof b* the Buver or upon failure of the Bu\er to make 
a m pmment or pavment? v.hen the same shall )«»come due or within 3 0 davs thereafter the 
Seller at his option shall have the following alternative remedies 
A Seller shall have the right UJMII failure of the Bu*er to remod* the default within five dnvs after written notire. 
\i lie rt leased from ail obligations in lav. and in equit* to convex waid propert\ and all pa*mtnt« whirl have 
been mart» theretofore oi this contract b* the Huvei shall l»e forfeited t< the te l ler a«» liquidated damages for 
tb« non performance of the contract and th< Buver agrees that the <^ Ilrr ma\ at hi* option r e e n t e r and take 
possession of said prcmisi s without Itral processes ns m its first und former estate topethcr w it! all imjirov. 
ments and additions maoe \\ tne B u \ e r tnereon a i d the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
th land become the property of th Selle the Huver becoming ai onee a tenant at -will of the Seller or 
B Th< Seller ms* bring suit and recover luorment lor all ritliiiouent installments includinr costs and a t t o r n e y 
feet (The use of tnis remem on one or more occasions shall noi prevent the *>eller at his option from resoitmg 
to one of the other remedies hcreund* r in tin event of a subsequent default) or 
C The Seller shall have the ripht at his option and upon written notice to tht Buxcr to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once du< and pavablc and max elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage and pass 
title to the Buver subiect thereti and proceed immediate!* to foreclose the same in accordance wit! the laws of 
the State of Utah and have the p r o p e m sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance ©wine 
including cost* and attorne* s fees and the tel ler n u t have s judjrment for a m dcficiencr which m*^ remain 
In the case of foreclosure the Seller hereunder upon the filing of a complaint shall he immediate!* entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged propert\ and collect the rents issue* and 
profits therefrom nnd appl\ the same to the pavment of the obturation hereunder or hold thi same pursuant 
to order of the court xr>d the Seller upon entr* of ;udpmcnt of foreclosure shall bf entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption 
17 It is apreed that time is the essence of this agreement 
18 In the event there are a m hens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to or in the event anv liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue ajrainst the 
same bv acts or neglect of the Seller then the Buver ma* at his option par and discharge the same and reretxe credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of anv such pa*ment or pax ments and thereafter the pa* 
ments herein pro* ided to be made maj at the option of the Buver be niispznded until such time as such suspended 
pa*ments shall equal anv sums advanced as aforesaid 
3° The Seller on receiving the pa*ments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
arree« to execute and deliver to the Buver or assigns a pood and sufficient warranty deed come*mg- the title to the 
*bo*e described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as ma* have accrued 
h* or through the acts or neplect of the Buver and to furnish at his expense a poliex of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller an abstract brought to aatc at time of sale or at an* time during the 
term of this agreement or at time of deliver* of deed at the optu n of Buver 
20 It is hereb3 express)* understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buver acrent* the said propertv 
in its present condition and that there are no representations covenants or agreements between tne parties hereto with 
reference to said propertv except as herein specificalh set forth or attached hereto 
none 
21 The Buter and Seller each agree that should the* default m ant of the covenants or agreements contained here 
m that the defaulting part* shall par all co*t* and expenses including a reasonable attorne* s fee which mm arise 
or accrue from enforcing" this agreement or in obtaining possession of the premise* covered herebj or in pursuing- an* 
remedv provided hereunder or b* the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remed* is pursued bv filing a suit 
or othervnse 
22 It i* understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to applv to and bind the heirs executors administrators sue-
ccssors and ass igns of the respectne partie« hereto 
"WITNESSlTHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto sig-ned their names the da* and vear 
flrstfaBo*. e written* 
SifrnV 
Seller 
.&{f*uiLrx 
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
David K. Broadbent (0442) 
Thomas M. Melton (4999) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B. 
COVINGTON, by and through its 
Co-Personal Representatives, 
Robert H. Covington and : AFFIDAVIT OF 
Mary C. Whetman, : MARY C. WHETMAN 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
: Civil NO.920009436CV 
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE C. : 
JOSEPHSON, : 
: Judge Robin Reese 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, being duly sworn, does depose and state as 
follows: 
1. I am one of the Co-Personal Representatives of the 
Estate of Douglas B. Covington, am over 21 years of age and am 
familiar with the facts of this case. 
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EXHIBIT "B' 
2. From May, 1973, and continuing throughout the 
course of our dealings with the Josephsons with regard to the 
property they purchased under contract from my parents, property 
taxes have been assessed jointly against their property and our 
remaining adjacent property, and each party has been responsible 
for its share of the taxes. The Josephsons have never objected 
to that treatment, and have, except for the taxes which are the 
subject of this action, paid all taxes so assessed. 
3. From May, 1973, and continuing throughout the 
course of our dealings with the Josephsons with regard to the 
property they purchased under contract from my parents, the water 
assessments have been assessed against a total block of water 
stock held in the Covington name, and the Josephsons have been 
responsible for payment of their pro rata share. The Josephsons 
have never objected to that treatment, and have, except for the 
assessments which are the subject of this action, paid all sums 
so assessed. 
4. On May 8, 1992, I paid the taxes due and owing on 
the property described in the tax notices attached to this 
Affidavit as Exhibit "A" in the amount of $3,377.15 and water 
assessments due and owing in the amount of $63.55. These amounts 
were due with respect to the Josephsons' property and water 
stock. 
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5. This payment was made to Superior Title Company, 
in connection with the sale of our remaining property which was 
adjacent to the real property purchased by the Josephsons in the 
contract described in the Complaint in this matter. Superior 
Title Company forwarded the tax payment to the Salt Lake County 
Treasurers's office, and obtained the receipts attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B". 
6. We were required by Superior Title Company and by 
the Salt Lake County Treasurer's office to pay the property taxes 
on both our parcel and the Josephson's parcel because the parcels 
had been assessed jointly by Salt Lake County, and unless all 
taxes were paid we would not have been able to deliver clear 
title to our purchasers. 
7. Although unknown to me and to the other co-
personal representative of the estate of Douglas Covington, the 
Josephsons were part of the group which purchased our property in 
the sale mentioned above. The Josephsons did not at the time nor 
have they since objected to our payment of the taxes on their 
property. 
8. During the trial before Judge Moffat regarding the 
right-of-way claimed by the Josephsons across our property, Mr. 
Cummings, their attorney, represented to us and to the court that 
the Josephsons would pay any taxes and water assessments which 
-3-
were due on their parcel, as they had previously paid since 1973 
throughout the course of our contract with them. 
9. Despite repeated assurances from the Josephsons 
and their counsel that reimbursement for the taxes would be 
forthcoming, I have not been reimbursed for the payment of the 
property taxes or the water assessments. 
10. I have reviewed the statement from Draper Bank 
which was attached to the affidavit of John C. Josephson and 
dated October 16, 1992. Said statement shows payments of 
principal and interest only, and does not show payment of taxes, 
since taxes were never paid through the Draper Bank escrow but 
were paid to my father or to his estate directly. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT 
DATED this <JJ day of December, 1992. 
Mary C^wietman 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this r-^Z day of 
December, 1992. 
Notary Public ! 
CHRISTINE STAPLEY I 175 Enst 400 South <&00 I 
Salt LafcoC^Uteh 84111 I 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake County/ Utah 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE .. . 
I hereby certify that, on the c>^/ day of December, 
1992, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Mary C. Whetman to 
the following: 
Gordon Madsen, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, UT 84054 
and telecopied a copy to him at 298-9460. 
5ft^£/ 
5158F 
? £ 
II 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
David K. Broaabent (0442) 
Sally B. McMinimee (5316) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B. 
COVINGTON, by and through its 
Co-Personal Representatives, 
Robert H. Covington and 
Mary C. Whetman, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
civil NO.. mm3335C\f 
Judge ^/id^y^ry//^^ 
The Estate of Douglas B. Covington, by and through its 
Personal Representatives, Robert H. Covington and Mary C. 
Whetman (hereafter "plaintiffs), hereby complain against the 
defendants and allege as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Jurisdiction in this Court arises under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3-4. 
INCH, YEATES 
QELOZAHLER 
Centre I, Suite 900 
ast Fourth South j 
ait Lake City j 
Utah 84111 I 
101)524-1000 EXHIBIT "C" 
2 . Venn*, i MM if" M11 '' " u a n t t o d t a n >\jde Ann. 
§ 7 8 - 1 3 - 1 . 
PARTIES 
3. Pi M U M Mt i'i»] i i i i i Million and Mary C, 
Whetman are Personal Representatives tor tne Estate ol; ijouyldo 
B. Covington. 
4. DcMlenaant • .inln il CIT"M 1 dine d„ Josephson are 
husband and wife and are residents oi Luxt Lake County, 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
tni:j ' • i iii, . ii i i :?ht-of-way across 
plaintiffs ' property. 
r
 . On October 27r 2953, Alice Hansen Covington 
",-OJiVevtMj ' I I I'M-'UM i dL !'i , I'uVMiMifi ii I'm' iV ' ice Hansen C o v i n q t o n , 
t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d in b a i t judKf 
C o u n t y : 
neyi..:. .. - t ^  ^  , n ^ v- -^  w ^ ^  w. -.. an« - ^  -. M. • e t 
Bast from the Southwest corner c: the 
Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter 
of Section 35, Townsnip 2, South, Range 1 
Bast, Salt LaKe Meridian, and . ur.r.ir.g thence 
Soutn ^0°15f East 863. -•-•:; tnence South 
69°15f Bast 82.5 feet; t:.^ ::ce North 0°38' 
West 615 .2 feet; thence West 3-1 feet ; he 
place JZ beginning. 
Said r^nperty is sometimes re:-J: red t herein as the 
'ur l y i rid . . 
6. In April of 1973, Douglas B. and Alice K. 
Covington (the "Covingtons"), entered into an option agreement 
with John and Geraldine Josephson (the "Josephsons") with 
regard to a portion of the Original Parcel. The option 
agreement is attached as Exhibit "A" and is referred to 
hereafter as the "Option". 
7. Pursuant to the terms of the Option, the 
Covingtons and the Josephsons entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract (the "UREC") dated May 4, 1973. The UREC is 
attached as Exhibit "B". 
8. Under the terms of the UREC, the Covingtons 
agreed to sell and the Josephsons agreed to buy the property 
described as follows: 
BEG, at a point N 89°54f10" W 1320 ft fr the 
SE cor of Sec 35, T2S, R1E, SLB&M and 
running th N 0°10,23" W 505.475 ft to a 
point on an old barbed wire fenceline; 
thence N 86°34,10" W 265.41 ft; th S 20°15' 
E 555.567 ft to the S line of said Sec 35; 
th along said S line S 89°54,10" E 74.17 ft 
to point of beg. 
9. At the time the UREC was executed/r the Covingtons 
executed a Warranty Deed conveying the above-described property 
to the Josephsons and delivered the Deed into escrow pending 
completion of the Josephesons1 obligations under the UREC. A 
copy of the Warranty Deed is attached as Exhibit "C". 
I! 
1 0 . N- •• .xuaea 
any reference. ~ r i g n t- - c L - * a _y a cr ooo w,,- _-=:i.ta -...-. n r ^, vir.aton 
c roper*:; -.*_ w^*- r *- : ** , 1^"*-, . _.: ^ s e p n s ^ n ana D o u g l a s 
o. uosepnsorJ signed 
^ zozji]T*=: z A:.^C:. :-ierec ^ ^ -— .:-**.-;. - cop y n f t^is 
do c u m e n t is at t a c h e d as ExniDit n b m , 
1 1 . A 1 i ij K ' II i 11 i M i 11 i i M i i,i 11 ** c e ~". and 
upon her death, all oi nei interest passed Lo Douglas h, 
Covington. Douglas fa. Covington died on September &"!, 
Plaintiffs a: =? t\ ::e > ; J IH-I i^pr^snnf i r »j m MM-* Pstate of 
Douglas B. Covington. 
12. On Decemher 2, 1988, at the request of 
p i a i n t i t L . i j i i i 111 J J l , * 11 M u i 111 ,. , 11 i i i i i i i i , 11 i 111 
J o s e p h s o n r e g a r d i n g his use of the cla i m e d r i g h t - o f - w a y ana 
no t i f y i n q him thrit his p e r m i s s i o n to use tne c l a i m e d 
r ight-oi-w«jy wa- I i f in u.iM.ii i | m i m r>t i " i itiachei 
as Exhibit " 1/ , 
IJ. On December 15, 1988/ Jonn C. and Geraldine C. 
J o s e p f j M 'in » , M in i i 11 ,i\ II i i I-M' i > i 11* M i i i ii n i i i M I T n i ti i er. t i i i he 
of f i c e of the Sail Lake County R e c o r d e r . JII LIIIJ N o t i c e , the 
J o s e p h s o n s claim .;i i i g h ^ - o f - w a y over the p r o p e r t y owned by the 
i u v i ii u .' MI i. u i u tc: in I ii i I • i ! i i T ,n 'In 11 .] r, [' MI i n i t r ' . 
•RINCE, YEATES 
V QELD2AHLER 
r Centre I, Suite 900 
i East Fourth South 
Salt lake City 
Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
14. In March of 1989, plaintiffs opbserved that the 
Josephsons were traversing the plaintiffs1 property to gain 
access to a portion of the Josephsons1 property and erected a 
fence across their property to stop the Josephsons from 
trespassing. 
15. On information and belief, the Josephsons removed 
the fence and continued to traverse the plaintiffs' property. 
Plaintiffs erected the fence a second time and, on information 
and belief, the Josephsons again removed the fence for the 
purpose of traversing plaintiffs1 property. 
FIRST CLAIK FOR RELIEF 
(Quiet Title and Declaratory Judgment) 
16. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate paragraphs 1 
through 15. 
17. Since 1953, plaintiffs or their predecessors in 
interest have been and continue to be the owners in fee of the 
following property: 
Beginning at a Point which is NORTH 
89°54f10n WEST 1320.00 feet and NORTH 
00°10f23" WEST 505.475 feet from the 
Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; and running thence NORTH 86o34'10" 
WEST along an existing fence line 265.41 
feet; thence NORTH 20o15l00B WEST 312.53 
feet; thence SOUTH 89°54f19" EAST 372.18 
feet; thence SOUTH 00°10'23" EAST 308.48 
feet to the Point of Beginning. Contains 
2.190 Acres. 
UNCE, YEATES 
GELDZAHLER 
Centre I, Suite 900 
East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84111 
801)524-1000 
- 5 -
1 8 . D ef e n d a n t s c J a i ro a n i n te re st i i i t h e 
above-described property :i i: 1 the form of ai i alleged right-of-way 
across the property. 
19 . f| I" i in * ' TI en n 1i " 1 II in i ' 111 11 r i i ' "t prnpp n ' [ -
without any riyhl whatever and aefe.'ijc;,. , uve nu e s t a t e , 
right, title, lien or inter e s t , in __ „ m e property ot any 
part ti lerec £ 
20, D e f e n d a n t s ' claim constitutes a cloud on 
pl a i n t i f f s ' title to the property. 
2 3 P u r s u a n t i r J n>
 L u , -. , I e_t seq. ai nd 
§ 7 8 - 4 0 - 1 , et seq. (1953, as a m e n d e d ) , p l a i n t i f f s seek a 
•judgment from thin Court quieting tit.le in plaintiffs and 
declaring that defendants h a w im enT»du , l i y U
 ( Ljf I »', I J '• * n; ''i: 
interest in or tn Lhe i eal property described in paragraph 1/' 
o f t 1: i i s C o m p J a i n 1, and t h a t plaintiffs are e n t i t 1 e d t o t h e 
quiet, lawf u. 1, and peaceful possess!on of suc 1: :i pro i »er t:;; -
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Slander of Title) 
reaj ] ege ai id :i r - 1 
t h r o u g h 2 1 . 
i.1 1 , D e f e n d a n t s k n p w r>i had r e a s o n to k n o w t h a t t h e 
N o t i c e or I n t e r e s t w i n U J U P . " I L i vi i U<' , i ni hi 
PRINCE, YEATES 
& GELDZAHLER 
y Cantrt 1, Suite 900 
j East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84111 
- 6 -
attached as Exhibit "F", contains a material misstatement or 
false claim, namely the claim of a right-of-way. 
24. On February 15, 1989, plaintiffs mailed a letter 
to defendants1 attorney demanding that defendants reiease the 
Notice of Interest insofar as it claimed a right-of-way. A 
copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit "G" and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
25. Defendants refuse to release the portion of the 
Notice of Interest that relates to the alleged right-of-way and 
the recorded Notice continues to cloud title to the property. 
26. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (1953, as 
amended), defendants are liable to plaintiffs for $1,000 or for 
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable 
attorneyfs fees and costs for refusing to release the Notice of 
Interest. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Trespass) 
27. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate paragraphs 1 
through 26. 
28. Defendants1 actions in removing the fence built 
on the plaintiffs1 property and continued use of plaintiffs' 
property for passage constitute trespass on plaintiffs1 
property. 
INCE. YEATES 
QELOZAHLER 
Centra I, Suit* 900 
MSX Fourth South 
Alt UK* City 
Utah 84111 
- 7 -
29. As the direct and proximate result of defendants 1 
actions, plaintiffs have been damaged and seek recovery of an 
an 10ui it t' : i: - 5 • :a 2t EM:I i i t tria] 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Injunctive Relief) 
3 0 . P J c , :i i 11: :i f £ s r e a ] 1 e g e a :i: d :i n c : o r p o r a t e p a r a g r a p h s ] 
?v cerenaa' :erer.car.:s 
demonst. «*. . 
c z n ti i n u e u s i r. • 
P-iaintnis of 
32-
j t L- r i v : r, a 
^ I . t-'ClaL-.c 
defendants 1 use of the property interferes with plaintiffs 1 use 
and title to the propeL i. y , 
33. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law O T 
otherwise for fhp harm or damage done and threatened to be done 
by defendant I >* i , i u v I i u
 t u i [ - ; i in 11 i 11 i i | i i | u- r 
34. Accordingly, plaintiffs seek an order of this 
Court p e r p e t u a 1 ] y enjoining and restraining defendants, their 
agents , atLoi. nt) , <iml i I " £i*j L *™^  »I is c ] a:i :i i i:i i : g b v m u i n l i i1 I I in 
from trespassing on plaintiffs* property, or otherwise 
•RINCE, YEATES 
L QELDZAHLER 
f Centre 1, Suite 900 
> Ernst Fourth South 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84111 
fftnn KOA.-innn 
interfering with the use and occupation of the land by 
plaintiffs. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court grant the 
following relief: 
1. On plaintiffs1 first cause of action, for a 
decree from the Court declaring and adjudging that plaintiffs 
own in fee simple and are entitled to the quiet and peaceful 
possession of the property; and that defendants, and all 
persons claiming under them, have no estate, right, title, lien 
or interest in or to the real property or any part thereof. 
2. On plaintiffs1 second cause of action, that 
pursuant to the § 38-9-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) 
plaintiff recover $1,000 or treble actual damages, whichever is 
greater and for attorneys fees and costs. 
3. On plaintiffs1 third cause of action for damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial. 
4. On plaintiffs1 fourth cause of action, for the 
Court to issue a permanent injunction restraining and enjoining 
defendants from using the plaintiffs1 real property, or in any 
manner interfering with the use and occupation of said real 
property by the plaintiffs. 
5. On all causes of action, that plaintiffs recover 
attorney's fees and costs of this action. 
*CE, YEATES 
ELDZAHLER 
. -itre I, Suite 900 
:*st Fourth South 
>att Lake City 
Utah 84111 
301)524-1000 
- 9 -
•WMCE, I'EATES 
ft QELDZAHLER 
y Centra I, Suite 900 
> East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84111 
(801) 524'1000 
6 . F o i ::; u c I i o 11 i e r a i i ci f i 1 r t I: :i € • r i: e 1 i e f a s t i 1 :i s C o u r t 
may deem p r o p e r and e q u i t a b l e . 
DATED t n i s & b " ^ ri a " ~- f M a y , 1 9 8 9 . 
FK^JCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
David K. Broadbentf 
Attorneys for P1aInt if f 
Plaintiffs1 Address 
941 Statice Avenue 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
0371n 
O P T I O N 
consideration of J In I
and 
Optionor , grant to_JLC£ S and, Optionee—, the option to purchase the hereinafter described property for the purchase price of %JL&£!£Cu2tf 6 
to be exercised by giving written notice thereof to Optioner at.. , County of 
..State of . 1 2 1 
^Sr- _, at any time on or before. s 
u 19 7J , at /J o'clock JZ_. M. If this Opt ion is exercised, then after receiving: written notice thereof,. 
Optionor— will furnish Optionee— with an abstract of title brought up to the date of exercise *f the Option or 
a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price and, upon payment of the purchase price due 
will deliver to Optionee_ a good and s u f f i c i e n t — / i - r ^ - 4 - deed conveying marketable fee simple 
title to the hereinafter described property, free and clear ot all encumbrances except as herein mentioned. The . 
consideration paid for this Option aha'l be credited on the purchase price 
DESCRIPTION OF PROPER' 
1
 ENCUMBRANCES 
-yff^L 
_________f^ ~^  
'sJv%>, 
STATE OF. 
COUNTY OF. 
On the 
BS. 
.day of. 
me. and. 
-, 19 , personally appeared before 
-, the 
signers of the above and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same* 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing at. 
• LANK NO. 1 1 * — © CCM PTO. CO — 3213 £ 0 2 6 0 0 LAST — SALT LAK£ CITY 
pyuf&pftfFF 
"THIS !S A IfGALlY I ' N D I N G C D N T * A " ».
 N c * JNOE*S*OOC, Set* C O M T T I K * >nv!C».' 
UNIFORM :::.._ ESTATE CONTRA C 
L THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 4 T * day of * I 2 L^_^ A. D. 18 
by -snd between * — ,— — • ' 
be.einafter oesignated as the Seller, and JO JiJ C. J .'. ^ l - r »M; C ' f i » U . . r - C. JOS' f . i^rr . , _ 
i s w i f ' „ f •»« -iru t e n **rv* n o t a? T«n i n ccr .nc ; - f w i t h f u l l ri', i:lfr o f s u r v i v o r s h i p s -
hereinafter designated »* the Buyer, of kfiXl l.a^Cw i t v
 t 
.2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, fo? trie consideration herein mentioned agreei to seli snd convey u> the buyer, 
and the buyer lor tne consiaeration herein mentioned agrees to purcnase the following describee real property, situate in 
the countr ©f S g j t L*kf> __., Stat* of Utah, to-m-it; . , , . 
A D D R U I 
More particularly described as follow* 
t C
 r » t a P o i n t N 8 9 ° 5 4 , i , - ^ _~ . : i . v i e ~ of i>*»c J S , * -
;.-! ; f f-'i^'.-r- arc! r u t r.irv t r N ? c : ^ r r ? " v. 5a J , 4 7 5 I t vc a p o i n t oi &r o i c D*~rbe*d 
v , i r - f f . r iC?. l in&; t h : ;-.c* " r ' c — — •• : - f s . 4 l i t ; it. L .C< i . ' - . . . M " f t 
t o t i ' o .ij, l i n e o f F M ; r - - c ?~ ; *i^r*~ fchj.o^'liii r * , - . 
t o p o i n t c ' b'.*f . 
5 
-»•;£ • i• • •• • •"I !"?: x, « h » r r « o f ^ a r vv :i 3 1 c m 11 r i r : a c:a oi > •»' i • r m i : : •' • • 
3. Said Buver hereby screes to enter into possession and p*y for said described premises the sum of
 ; _ 
-) 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or oroer ' * r"- "" M " ' A l j l ' ^ h - - t ——. 
.tnctly * t h » the foUnrmc tinm. t*-*it: " ' ' T . - ^ J S , - . ^ -V - HC/10C
 ( , 3 , 0 0 0 . ^ 0 , 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and 'the balance of * f T* *,n*11 *** p a i d * s J o l ' o w i : 
SlL)7,U'v! or rorc P?T nontn cosncncinr Juno 10, 1973 end montr.Iy thrrcftiter 
utktil pTinci:»l balance top other *ith accrued intctesi has. neen paid in full* 
Any payront t:, i t b r c c r «f 1 S da y F O r n a r * r1 r» 1 i n c u <? n t 6 h a 11 h«? c h t . r o c ri a $ 5 , 0 0 
p »-• r r. r. r. t h 1*tv c h a r r. t , 
'• T • I ^ v i n r t o n ? l. o 11 r v t r i n u ? < o 1" 1 1 c; r * o r D r c p ^ r t y f o r a w: : i«""' u of 11 ) y « r s . 
" u w r .if f ' ^ s t o n o t h o l e » e l l < ? r l i a r . l c f o r r n v f u t u r e p r o o l e m i ; c r l i t i f * t i r . n 
w i t ! ; r e r a n ' t o i^runr'ary l i n e rtipcrepancy b c t r p r n s u r v e y a r d e x i r t : nr f p n e e l i n o 
S e l l e r a r r c - ' S t o a s t i f t b u y e r i n a n y way p o s s i b l e - t o r p . s o l v f proi . - lu . . , . 
Possession of said premises shall 'be delivered to buyer on the 4 tL osy of ii£i! L-__Li__1 19— — 
4. Said monthly payments are to 'be applied first to the psyment of interest and second to the reduction of tne 
principal. Interest shall be charged from :bl£"' 7 '~ , on all unpaid portion* of ti » 
purchase price at the rate of E
 p e r cent («___§ Tc) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortnurc 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied eitner to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time, the excess payment u made. 
5. I t is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so d o m e it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of ,___—,,________-_—-
norip with an unpaid balance of 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvement* 'to said prem-
ises now in the proct^s of being installed, or which .have been completed and no: paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the iollom-ing n n r t r — — , . __— . 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed tht 
then unpaid 'Contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not 'to exceed §. _ percent 
( **) p€T annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the agrreg*te monthly installment 
payment* required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. Wr*n the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgage* the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of aaid prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property wcumd by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unitn 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable Under lor a loan oi such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of aaid lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-naif the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-naif, provided however, that the -monthly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The B u y e r agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this acrreement The Seller hereby covenanu and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
none 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property. 
12 The Buyer agree* to par the general U i « after 5 - 4 * 7 3 
IS. The Buyer furthe- agrees to keep all insurable building* and improvements oc said premises insured m a < 
P*J»y acceptable to the Sailer m the amount of not lee* than the unpaid balance on this contract, or l_ n / i 
and to assign aa*d meuranee to the Seller aa his interests nar appear and to deliver Use insurance policy to him. 
U In the event the Buyer shall oeiauh in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessment* or insurance 
premiums as herein provided,, the Selier may ax his option pav said taxes assessments and insurance premiums or eitneT 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buver agrees to repay tne Seller upon demand *U tuch sums so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from oate of payment oi said sums at the rate of V of one percent per 
month unti. paid 
16 Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committee any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in rood condition 
16. In the event of s failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failurt of the Buyer to make 
20. . cays thereafter, the any payment or payments when the same shall become due. or within 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released froir all obligation* in law and in equity to convey said property and all pa> menu which have 
been made theretofore on tnis contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and tht Buyer agree* that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
posses* tor of said premises without legal processes as in its f i l l and former estate torvther with sll improve-
ments end additions made by the Buyer thereon and the said addition* and improvement* shall remain with 
the land N f o m t th« property of the Seller the Buyer becoming at enee • U M n i at will «f tn« Kri»«r, *r 
B The Seller m*y bnng »uil and recover judjrment for all delinquent i m u l i m t r i u including coat* and attorney* 
fee* (The use of thi* remeoy on one or more occasion* shall not prevent the Seller, al hu option, from resorting 
to one of the other rentedie* hereunder in the event of a subsequent default) or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the enure unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and ma* eiect to treat thia contract a* a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, a no proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the law* of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceed* applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney* fees, and the Seller ms\ have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, tne Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged propert) and collect the rent*, issue* and 
profit* therefrom and appl> the aame to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court, and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure shall be entitled to the possession 
of the aaid pr^mi»e» during the period of redemption 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
18 In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premise* other than those herein provided for or 
referred to or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for ahall hereafter accrue against the 
aame by acu or nefloet of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, nay *nd discharge the »*me and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any sucr. payment or payment* *nd thereafter the pay-
menu herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aioreaaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payment* herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manne* *hove mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns., a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title Xt> the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
bv or through the acts or neglect of the Buver, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of titie insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at anj time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buver. 
20 h is hereby expresalj understood and agreed br the parties her< to that the Buver accept* tht said property 
in its present conditior and that there art no representations, covenants, or agreements hetween tht parues hereto uith 
reference to aaid property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto _ 
nor>o 
21. The Buyer ^nd Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreement* contained here-
in, that the defaulting P*«y shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attomev's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the nremises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedj t* pursued bj filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrator*, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
~lHvWITNESS WHEREOF, the aaid parties to this agreement have hereunto signed! their names, the day and year 
first sbd*e wntpej\, 
C^CJrS^ .JCn,*L\ :k, 'I'n^^L 
^ '/. .. ^/ / / . . w . J -T 
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description is obtained* 
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Mr. John C. Josephson 
8560 South Danish Road 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Dear Mr. Josephson: 
This firm repre 
Covington. In connectio 
estate we have obtained 
Danish Road and have met 
discuss the history of i 
have been using a portio 
south border to obtain a 
understand that you have 
to provide whatever acce 
Covington property. 
sents the e 
n with our 
a survey of 
with repre 
ts property 
n of the Co 
ccess to pr 
sufficient 
ss you may 
state of Douglas B. 
representation of this 
the estate's property on 
sentatives of the estate to 
We understand that you 
vington property along its 
operty you own. he also 
property along Danish Road 
need without using the 
Accordingly, you are hereby notified that your 
permission to traverse the Covington property is terminated and 
that at the expiration of thirty days following the date of 
this letter the Covington estate will place a barrier across 
the portion you have been using. 
Very truly yours, 
David K. Broa'dbent 
DKB/cs 
7062b 
£*%,T ^ r ^ 6? r** j j 
NOTICE OF INTEREST 
JOHN C. JOSEPHSON and GERALD I r«M: C. JOSEPHSON, his wife, 
hereby give notice that they claim an interest in and to the 
following-described tract (Tract 1) by virtue of a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract dated May 4, 1973, wr.erein Douglas B. Covington 
and Alice H. Covington appear as sellers and John C. Josephson and 
Geraldine C. Joncphson appear as buycrsr which contract covers the 
following tract (Tract 1) and is situate in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, to-wit: 
TRACT 1: "Beginning at a point North 89° 541 10" West 
1320 feet' from the Southeast corner of Section 35, 
Township 2 South, Ranqe 1 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian, and running thence North U° 10f 23M West 
505.475 feet to a point on an old barbed wire fenceline; 
thence North 36° 34' 10" West 265.41 feet; thence South 
2CC 151 555.567 feet to the South line of said Section 
35; thence along said South line South 89° 54" 10" East 
74.17 feet to point of beginning. 
Together with 5 shares of Big Willow Irrigation water 
stock. 
The following-described tract (TRACT 2) situate in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, being a part of the foregoing description, has 
.heretofore been deeded by the said Douglas B. Covington and Alice 
H. Covington to the undersigned, to-wit: 
TRACT 2: Beqinning at a point North 89° 54' 10" West 
1320.0 feet and North 0° 10' 23" West ZQ2.Q feet from 
the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running 
thence North 0° 10!23" West 130.0 feet; thence South 89° 
54' 10" West 176.2 feet to a fence line; thence South 
19° 56' East along said fence line 138.28 feet; thence 
South 89° 541 10" East 129.06 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
The undersigned also claim a right-of-way for ingress to 
and egress from the foregoing tracts over a tract (TRACT 3) 
adjacent on the north by virtue of an Option agreement granted to 
the undersigned by the said Douglas B. Covington and Alice H. 
Covington dated April 6, 1973. The property (Tract 3) over which 
said right of way (which right of way is south of Covington Drive 
Way) is claimed is situate in Salt Lake County, Utah, and 
described as follows: 
TRACT 3: Commencing North 89° 54' 10" West 1320 feet and 
North 0° 10' 23" West 505.475 feet from the Southeast 
corner of Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base & Meridian, and runnina thence North 0° 
10' 23" West 309.725 feet; thence North 89° 44' West 381 
feet; thence South 20° 15' Easr. 303.333 feet, more or 
less (to a point North 86o34!10" Went 265.41 feet from 
the point of beginning); unence South 86° 34' 10" East 
265.41 feet to the place of beginning. 
DATED this tf day cf December, 1988. 
GERALDINE C. JOSE^fiSON1/ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF FALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 
[^ day of December, 198B, by JOHN C. JOSEPHSON and GERALDINE 
C. JOSEPHSON, tr>e signers of the foregoinq instrument. 
/1&* t?> £u 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires; 
oil / < / f r ^ 
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February 15, 1989 
Robert C. Cummings, Esq. 
225 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Right-of-Way Dispute between the Estate of 
Douglas B. Covington and John C. and Geraldine C. 
Josephson 
Dear Mr. Cummings: 
As you are aware, this firm represents the estate of 
Douglas B. Covington in connection with the above-referenced 
matter. I am in receipt of your letter dated December 16, 
1988, in which you assert a right-of-way on behalf of John C. 
and Geraldine C. Josephson over the property of my client and 
under which you enclosed a Notice of Interest which, among 
other things, asserts your clients claim to such right-of-way. 
I have discussed this alleged right-of-way in detail 
with my client. After careful consideration of all of your 
client's assertions, it is my client's position that no legal 
right-of-way was granted nor does it now exist. 
Accordingly, I hereby demand on behalf of my client 
that your client release that portion of the subject Notice of 
Interest that relates to the alleged right-of-way. 
If your client's fail to do so within ten days of your 
receipt of this letter, I have been instructed to commence 
legal action against your client to protect my client's 
interest in the subject property. 
DKB:jc 
cc: Mr. Robert Covington 
Ms. Mary Whetman 
5274L 
Very truly yours, 
David K. Broadbent 
>~j?L 
R E C E I V E D 
JUN221989 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777 
Attorney for the Defendants 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
6G 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
III AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B., 
COVINGTON, by and through its 
Co-Personal Representatives, 
Robert H. Covington and 
Mary C. Wheaton, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN C. and GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants. 
Come now the defendants and answer plaintiff's Complaint 
as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Said Complaint fails to state a claim against 
defendants upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
2. Admit the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
and 6. 
3. Admit the allegations of paragraph 7 and 8f except 
allege that the document attached hereto as Exhibit C was executed 
concurrently with the Uniform Real Estate Contract (copy of which 
EXHIBIT " 0 " 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. C-89-3339 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
is annexed hereto as Exhibit B),and as a part thereof, and by the 
terms of said instruments (Exhibits A and B hereto) the right-of-
way described in the Option Agreement was a part of the said 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. Also the said contract covered five 
shares of Big Willow Irrigation Water Stock. Except as admitted 
heretin, the allegations of said paragraphs 7 and 8 are denied. 
4. Answering paragraph 9, admit that a Warranty Deed 
was placed in escrow, and otherwise deny the allegations of said 
paragraph 9. 
5. Answering paragraph 10, the defendants acknowledge 
that the said document attached to plaintiff's Complaint as 
Exhibit D (wnich is attacned to this Answer and Counterclaim as 
Exhibit C) was executed, allege that the same is a part of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, and allege that pursuant thereto the 
legal description of the right-of-way was to be determined by 
survey and included by metes and bounds in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract and in the aforesaid Warranty Deed, and allege that said 
Exhibit D to plaintiff's Complaint was executed on behalf of all 
sellers and buyers and was executed at the closing, and otherwise 
deny the allegations of paragraph 10. 
6. Admit the allegations of paragraph 11. 
7. Answering paragraph 12, admit that defendants sent 
the letter dated December 2, 1988, copy of which is attached to 
plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit E, and admit that the same was 
sent at the request of plaintiff, deny that plaintiff had any 
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right to terminate said right-of-way, and otherwise deny the 
allegations thereof. 
8. Admit the allegations of paragraph 13. 
9. Answering paragraph 14, admit that the plaintiff 
attempted to interfere with defendants1 right-of-way into the 
property by erecting a fence, and otherwise deny the allegations 
of paragraph 14. 
10. Answering paragraph 15, defendants admit that they 
prudently and without any breach of the peace removed all 
obstructions placed on their right-of-way and that they have 
continued to use the said right-of-way, and deny each and every 
other allegation of paragraph 15. 
11. Answering paragraph 16, defendants adopt as their 
answer thereto their answers as hereinabove set forth to the 
paragraphs referred to therein. 
12. Answerinq paragraph 17, admit that plaintiff is the 
owner of said property subject to the right-of-way of defendants 
to cross said property from Danish Road to gain access to 
defendants1 property (located adjacent to the plaintiff on the 
south) at a location approximately 150' west of Danish Road, and 
otherwise deny the allegations of said paragraph 17. 
13. Admit the allegations of paragraph 18. 
14. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 19, 20 and 21. 
-3-
15. Answering paragraph 22, defendants adopt as their 
answer thereto their answers as hereinabove set forth to the 
paragraphs referred to therein. 
16. Deny the allegations of paragraph 23. 
17. Answering paragraph 24, admit that plaintiff's 
counsel sent Exhibit G, and otherwise deny the allegations of 
paragraph 24. 
18. Answering paragraph 25, defendants admit that they 
claim the right-of-way as granted to them under the Option and 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, that they have refused to release 
the same, and allege their entitlement to said right-of-way, and 
otherwise deny the allegations of paragraph 25. 
19. Deny the allegations of paragraph 26 and allege 
said instrument is valid and accurate and was recorded in good 
faith. 
20. Answering paragraph 27, defendants adopt as their 
answer thereto their answers as hereinabove set forth to the 
paragraphs referred to therein. 
21. Deny the allegations of paragraphs 28 and 29. 
22. Answering paragraph 30, defendants adopt as their 
answer thereto their answers as hereinabove set forth to the 
paragraphs referred to therein. 
23. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 30, 
31, 32, 33 and 34. 
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24. Deny each and every allegation of said Complaint 
not hereinabove specifically admitted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
25. Defendants have paid all amounts owing under the 
said Uniform Real Estate Contract and are entitled to conveyance 
of the tract described in the Uniform Real Estate Contract and the 
right-of-way referred to in the said Option and in the two 
documents constituting the said Uniform Real Estate Contract 
(Exhibits A and B hereto), and plaintiff has wrongfully refused to 
make conveyance thereof. Plaintiff's claims are without merit and 
are not asserted in good faith, and defendants are entitled to 
reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Section 78-27-56, Utah Code 
Annotated. By reason of the foregoing plaintiff is barred and 
estopped from asserting its claims, and defendants are entitled to 
relief as set forth in their Counterclaim, which is incorporated 
as an additional affirmative defense at this point. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
As a Counterclaim against plaintiffs (hereafter referred 
to collectively as "plaintiff") defendants allege as follows: 
1. On or about April 6, 1973, defendants and 
plaintiff's predecessors, Douglas B. and Alice H. Covington, 
entered into an Option Agreement, copy of which is annexed hereto 
as Exhibit A. 
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2. In addition to granting defendants the right to 
acquire the principal tract of land of approximately two acres in 
size and five shares of water stock, the said Option granted a 
right-of-way to said tract across the property of said Douglas B. 
and Alice H. Covington from Danish Road to the north side of the 
property being purchased by defendants, entering that property at 
a point approximately 150' west of Danish Road, in the following 
language: 
"There will be an access R/W conveyed which is to 
be described just south of Covington Drive/Way." 
Defendants exercised the Option, and a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was entered into consisting of two documents, copies of 
which are annexed hereto as Exhibits B and C. 
3. By virtue of the foregoing, defendants were 
entitled to a conveyance from plaintiff's predecessors of the 
principal tract, described in the said Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, together with five shares of Big Willow Irrigation, 
together with a right-of-way across plaintiff's predecssor's 
property "from Danish Road to the north side of defendants1 
property." 
4. At the time the said Option was entered into and 
the said Uniform Real Estate Contract was entered into, a right-of-
way existed from Danish Road across the property retained by the 
plaintiff and into the north side of the property sold by 
plaintiff's predecessors to the defendants. The said right-of-way 
was used for many years by the said Douglas B. and Alice H. 
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Covington to access mink pens and outbuildings located on the 
property purchased by defendants. This right-of-way is 
hereinafter referred to as the "Existing Right-of-Way." Tne 
defendants have used the existing right-of-way with the consent of 
plaintiff!s predecessors, Douglas B. and Alice H. Covington, from 
1973 until the present time. Such use was without objection 
whatsoever until the plaintiff attempted to interfere therewith in 
December 1988. 
5. Defendants are entitled to a conveyance from 
plaintiff by warranty deed as provided in the said Uniform Real 
Estate Contract to the tract of land described therein, together 
with five shares of water stock, together with the existing right-
of-way to and from the aforesaid tract across the following-
described tract of plaintiff's land located in Salt Lake Couty, 
Utah, to-wit: 
Commencing North 89° 54' 10" West 1320 feet and North 
0° 10f 23" West 505.475 feet from the Southeast corner 
of Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base & Meridian, and running thence North 0° 10f 23" 
West 309.725 feet; thence North 89° 441 West 381 feet; 
thence South 20° 151 East 303.333 feet, more or less (to 
a point North 86°34,10" West 265.41 feet from the point 
of beginning); thence South 86° 341 10" East 265.41 feet 
to the place of beginning. 
The existing right-of-way is approximately 15 feet wide and the 
center line thereof commences approximately 15 to 20 feet north of 
the boundary line between the parties and enters the property of 
the defendants approximately 150 feet west of Danish Road. The 
said right-of-way is clearly defined, having been used in excess 
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of 17 years, and is subject to being surveyed and described by 
metes and bounds description. Defendants allege that the parties 
intended, in executing the Option and the two documents that 
constitute the Uniform Real Estate Contract, that defendants have 
the existing right-of-way as access to the tract being purchased 
by defendants and that the same be included in the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract and warranty deed and that it be included with a 
metes and bounds description. 
6. The said Uniform Real Estate Contract has been 
fully paid and performed by defendants, and defendants are 
entitled to conveyance as set out in paragraph 5 of this 
Counterclaim. 
7. The plaintiffs refusal to so convey is without 
merit and not asserted in good faith, and defendants are entitled 
to all damages sustained by them as proved at trial, including 
reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Section 78-27-56. Para-
graph 21 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract also provides for the 
award of reasonable attorney's fees in enforcing said contract as 
may be proved at the time of trial. 
8. The plaintiff has attempted on several occasions 
during the period between December 1988 and commencement of this 
action to obstruct the said right-of-way by erecting a fence 
across the same to prevent defendants from using the same. 
9. The plaintiff threatens to obstruct the same in 
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the future, and plaintiff will commit and continue to commit the 
unlawful act of attempting to obstruct said right-of-way unless 
restrained in violation of defendants1 rights. 
10. Such an obstruction of said right-of-way will 
result in great and irreparable injury to defendants. 
11. By reason of such unlawful obstruction of said 
right-of-way, defendants have been damaged in the sum of $2,500. 
12. Such act of objstruction was malicious, wilful and 
intentional, and defendants are entitled to punitive damages in 
the sum of $10,000. 
13. Defendants have no adequate remedy at law, or 
otherwise, for the damage threatened to be done by plaintiff 
because damages will not compensate them for the loss of use of 
the easement for said purposes. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
As their Second Cause of Action against plaintiff the 
defendants allege as follows: 
14. Defendants adopt the allegations of their First 
Cause of Action. 
15. DrfnndnntR nm r>nj|ii»n \n lorhritml Inn nf \r\\h HH\A 
Uniform Real Estate Contract and deed to include therein the 
provision granting to the defendants a right-of-way from Danish 
Road to the north part of their property across the existing right-
of-way and that the same be described by metes and bounds 
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description, or in the alternative at a location mutually 
convenient to the parties. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that plaintifffs Complaint be 
dismissed and that this court determine that defendants are the 
owners in fee simple absolute of the property described in said 
Real Estate Contract attached hereto as Exhibit B, together with 
the five shares of Big Willow Irrigation Water Stock, together 
with A tujM-ot-way across the property of plaintiff described in 
paragraph 5 above extending from Danish Road at a point 
approximately 20 feet north of the boundary line between the 
parties to the north side of defendants1 property and enter the 
same approximately 150 feet west of Danish Road, and that the 
court adjudge the metes and bounds description of said right-of-
way after survey thereof has been performed, and that plaintiff be 
required to convey the foregoing by warranty deed, for reasonable 
attorney's fees, costs and for such other relief as is just to be 
granted, for damages in the sum of $2,500 plus damages for failure 
to convey said right-of-way as maya be proved at trial, for 
punitive damages in the sum of $10,000, and adjudging that 
plaintiff be perpetually enjoined from interfering with 
defendants1 use and occupancy of said right-of-way, and for such 
other relief as is just to be granted in the premises. 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS ~j? / 
Attorney for the Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Answer and 
Counterclaim was mailed to David K. Broadbent and Sally B. 
McMinimee, attorneys for the plaintiff, at their address, 175 East 
Fourth South, #900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, 
this *7/l day of June, 1989. 
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RINCE, YEATES 
I QELDZAHLER 
C«ntr* i, Suite 900 
East Fourth South 
Sttt U k t City 
Utah 64111 
(501) 524-1000 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
David K. Broadbent (0442) 
Sally B. McMinimee (5316) 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B. 
COVINGTON, by and through its 
Co-Personal Representatives, 
Robert H. Covington and 
Mary C. Whetman, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants, 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS1 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. C-89-3339 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
The Estate of Douglas B. Covington, by and through its 
Co-Personal Representatives, Robert H. Covington and Mary C. 
Whetman (hereafter "plaintiffs"), answer defendants1 
Counterclaim as follows: 
EXHIBIT "E ne*« 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Defendants1 Counterclaim fails to state a claim 
against plaintiffs upon which relief can be granted. 
tINCE, YEATE8 j 
QELDZAHLER I 
^•ntrtl,Sult#900 | 
East Fourth South 
>att U k t City 
Utth 84111 
101) 524-1000 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Responding to the specific allegations of defendants1 
Counterclaim, plaintiffs respond as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs admit the allegations of paragraph 1 
of defendants1 Counterclaim. 
2. Plaintiffs admit that the option agreement 
(hereafter "Option") granted defendants the right to acquire 
the principal tract of land plus five shares of water stock 
(hereafter "the Property"), that the defendants exercised the 
Option with respect to the Property, and that a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract was entered into which covered the Property. 
Plaintiffs deny all other allegations contained in paragraph 2 
of defendants1 Counterclaim. 
3. Plaintiffs admit that upon performance of their 
objections under the Uniform Real Estate Contract the 
defendants should be entitled to a conveyance of the Property 
described in the Uniform Real Estate Contract but, upon 
information and belief, deny that defendants have performed 
said obligations. Plaintiffs further allege that they 
delivered a deed to a portion of the Property to defendants and 
that they delivered a deed to the remaining portion into Escrow 
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as required by said contract. Plaintiffs deny all other 
allegations contained in paragraph 3 of defendants1 
Counterclaim. 
4. Plaintiffs admit that the Covingtons used a path 
to reach various parts of their property, but deny that the 
Covingtons1 use of their property created a right-of-way in 
favor of defendants, as alleged in paragraph 4 of defendants1 
Counterclaim. The plaintiffs deny any other allegations 
contained in paragraph 4 of defendants' Counterclaim. 
5. Plaintiffs admit that upon performance of 
defendants obligations under the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
by defendants, defendants shall be entitled to the conveyance 
referred to in paragraph 5(a) and (b) of defendants1 
Counterclaim, but allege that the Covingtons discharged their 
obligations to convey the Property to defendants by executing a 
Warranty Deed on June 6, 1978 and delivering the deed into 
escrow. Plaintiffs deny the allegations of paragraph 5(c) of 
defendants' Counterclaim. 
6. Plaintiffs are without information or belief as 
to the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of defendants' 
Counterclaim and, therefore, deny the same, and further allege 
that the Covingtons' conveyed the Property to the defendants by 
delivery of a Warranty Deed into Escrow at the time the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract was executed. 
•WNCE, YEATE8 
I QEUKAHUEft 
r Central, Suit* 900 
> East Fourth South 
Salt Ukt City j 
Utah 84111 j 
(801) 524.1000 I 
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7. Plaintiffs deny the allegations of paragraph 7 of 
defendants' Counterclaim. 
8. Plaintiffs admit that they have attempted to 
obstruct defendants' continuing trespass onto their property by 
constructing a fence across the property. Plaintiffs deny all 
other allegations of paragraph 8 of defendants' Counterclaim. 
9. Plaintiffs deny the allegations in paragraph 9 of 
defendants' Counterclaim. 
10. Plaintiffs deny the allegations in paragraph 10 
of defendants' Counterclaim. 
11. Plaintiffs deny the allegations in paragraph 11 
of defendants' Counterclaim. 
12. Plaintiffs deny the allegations in paragraph 12 
of defendants1 Counterclaim. 
13. Plaintiffs deny the allegations in paragraph 13 
of defendants' Counterclaim. 
14. Plaintiffs incorporate their answers to 
paragraphs 1 through 14 in answer to paragraph 14 of 
defendants' Counterclaim. 
15. Plaintiffs deny the allegations of paragraph 15 
of defendants1 Counterclaim. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims against plaintiff are barred by the 
Statute of Frauds. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Defendants1 claims against plaintiff are barred by the 
Doctrine of Unclean Hands. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims against plaintiff are barred by a 
lack of consideration. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims against plaintiffs are barred by 
the Statute of Limitations. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs request that this Court dismiss 
witn prejudice defendants' Counterclaim against plaintiffs and 
award plaintiffs their QO^ts of defense plus attorneys' fees. 
DATED this 
f-
day of July, 1989, 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
David K. Broadbent 
Sally B1. McMinimee 
Attorneys'for Plaintiffs 
WINCE, YEATES 
I QELDZAHLEft 
' O n t r t l , SulttSOO 
East Fourth South 
Salt Laka City 
Utah 84111 
(801)524-1000 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that, on the day of July, 1989, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM to the 
following: 
-5-
Robert C. Cummings 
Attorney for Defendants 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah b4111 
&L 'U^ 
0506n 
071489 
INCE. YEATE8 
QELDZAHLEft 
*ntrtl,Su»tt900 
*tt Fourth South 
*lt Ukt City 
Utah 84111 
U)1) 524-1000 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
ROBERT C. CUMKINGS, #777 
Attorney for the Defendants 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
6F 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B., 
COVINGTON, by and through its 
Co-Personal Representatives, 
Robert H. Covington and 
Mary C. Whetman, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN C. and GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled action came on for trial on the 
19th day of June, 1991, before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
District Court Judge. The plaintiffs appeared in person and 
by and throuch their attorneys, David K. Broadbent and Sally 
McMinixnee, and the defendants appeared in person and by and 
through their attorney, Robert C. Cummings. The Court heard the 
opening arguments of counsel and the evidence presented during 
plaintiffs1 case in chief, and the parties stipulated with regard 
to certain testimony as set forth in the record, and the parties 
having further stipulated that the matter of attorneys fees be 
reserved for determination after the trial. The defendants made a 
EXHIBIT "F* 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-89-3339 
Judge Richard B. Moffat 
motion for nonsuit at the conclusion of the plaintiffs1 case in 
chief, and the court determined that, based upon the facts and 
law, the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief on their Complaint 
and determined that defendants are entitled to the right-of-way as 
hereinafter set forth, and the matter of attorney's fees having 
been presented by affidavit and argument of counsel for the 
parties conducted on October 25, 1991, and the Court, being 
advised in the premises, and the Court, having heretofore made 
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
1. The defendants and their heirs and assigns forever 
are owners in fee simple of the following-described real property 
in Salt Lake County, Utah: 
Beginning at a point North 89° 54* 10" West 1320 feet 
from the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, running 
thence North 0° 10f 23" West 505.475 feet to a point on 
an old barbed wire fence line; thence North 86° 34' 10" 
West along an existing fence line 265.41 feet; thence 
South 20° 15fEast 555.567 feet to the South line of said 
Section 35; thence along said South line South 89° 54* 
10" East 74.17 feet to the point of beginning. 
Less the following-described tract: 
Beginning at a point North 89° 54f 10" West 1374.47 feet 
from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence North 89° 54f 10" West 10.88 feet; thence 
North 20° 15' West 155.99 feet to the Southeast corner 
of Lot 12, Scottish Heights No. 1-A; thence North 20° 
15' West 317.95 feet to the Northeast corner of Lot 10, 
Scottish Heights No. 1-A; thence South 89° 421 07" East 
12.03 feet to fence line; thence South 19° 56' East 
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along fence line 316.93 feet? thence South 20° 30' East 
along fence line 156.57 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with the following described tract: 
Beginning at a point North 89° 54f 10" West 1320.00 feet 
from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 
Southr Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence North 89° 54 * 10" West 54.47 feet to 
fence line; thence South 20° 30' East along fence line 
6.41 feet to fence corner? thence South 89° 541 10" East 
along fence line 52.24 feet? thence North 0° 10f 23" 
West 6.00 feet ro the point of beginning. 
Together with a non-exclusive right-of-way for ingress 
to and egress from the aforesaid tracts described in this 
paragraph 1 of this Judgment over the following-described tract: 
Beginning at a point which is North 89° 54' 10" West 1320 
feet and North 0° 10f 23" West 505.475 feet from the 
Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence North 
86° 34' 10" West along an existing fence line 125 feet, more 
or less, to the west boundry of existing entrance way to 
defendants1 real property hereinabove described in this 
paragraph 1 of this Judgment? thence North 0° 10 * 23" West 15 
feet? thence South 86° 34f 10" East 125 feet, more or less, 
to the Fast boundry of plaintiffs1 property described in 
paragraph 3 below; thence South 0° 10f 23" East 15 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
If plaintiffs or their heirs or assigns forever elect to 
maintain a locked gate across said right-of-way, a key 
thereto will be furnished at all times by the party 
maintaining said locked gate to defendants and their heirs, 
and assigns forever. 
2. The defendants are owners of five (5) shares of Big 
Willow Irrigation Company water stock, which have been delivered 
to them. 
3. Plaintiffs and their heirs and assigns forever are 
owners in fee simple of the following-described real property in 
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Salt Lake County, Utah, subject only to the non-exclusive right-of-
way referred to in paragraph 1 above: 
Beginning at a point which is North 89° 54' 10" West 
1220,00 feet and North 00° 10' 23" West 5G5.475 feet 
froir, the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian? and 
running thence North 86° 34' 10" West along an existing 
fence line 265.41 feet; thence North 20° 15' 00" West 
312.53 feet; thence South 89° 541 19" East 372.18 feet; 
thence South 00° 10f 23" East 308.48 feet to the point 
of Beginning. 
4. The defendants are awarded attorney's fees in the 
amount of $4,000.00, together with their costs of court of $74.00. 
DATED this > & day of December, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
Ifi Jicb/^ * > fact-fa 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
The foregoing Judgment 
approved as to form: 
I H. BROADBENT DAVID 
SALLEY McMINIMEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
V U>^/ 
V?c.l£j °1i 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorney for Defendants 
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
David K. Broadbent (0442) 
Thomas M. Melton (4999) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B. : 
COVINGTON, by and through its : 
Co-Personal Representatives, : 
Robert H. Covington and : AFFIDAVIT OF 
Mary C. Whetman, : DAVID K. BROADBENT 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
: Civil NO.920009436CV 
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE C. : 
JOSEPHSON, : 
: Judge Robin Reese 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, being duly sworn, does depose and state as 
follows: 
1. I am over 21 years of age, represented the 
Covingtons in a prior action against the defendants herein, and 
am familiar with the matters referred to herein and the facts of 
-1-
BiHlBlT "6" 
this case. 
2. On several occasions prior to the trial regarding 
the right-of-way claimed by the Josephsons across the Covingtons' 
property, and on at least one occasion during the trial, Mr. 
Cummings, their attorney, represented to me and to the court that 
the Josephsons would pay any taxes and water assessments which 
were due on their parcel. He stated to the court (and the 
Covingtons and their counsel agreed) that the case before the 
court was to determine the existence of the right-of-way which 
was the subject of the action. There was no issue or question 
regarding payments under the installment sales contract under 
which the right-of-way was claimed, as the Covingtons 
acknowledged that no further amounts were owed to them under said 
contract. No evidence was presented by either side at the trial 
regarding any taxes or water assessments owed with regard to the 
Josephsons' property. In fact, the Josephsons presented no 
evidence at the trial. 
3. Consistent with and in furtherance of the 
Josephsons' statements that they would pay the taxes and water 
assessments owed, I delivered to Mr. Cummings the letter dated 
June 5, 1992, which is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "A", 
and received in response his letter dated June 22, 1992, which is 
attached as Exhibit "B". On no occasion did Mr. Cummings dispute 
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the Josephson's obligation to pay the taxes and assessments 
referred to in the letters• 
DATED this > " day of December, 1992. 
JL \<£^^vJL\4rttf 
December, 
David K. Broadbent 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this cSu day of 
1992. 
» / ^ 
ZsZdL u?A 
Notttfy Public J 
on?fS^paa:eaiCi tsco i 
*-. . . . ^c;iy,ULLh£4111 J 
'&£, 1995 I 
tateofUtah I 
Notary'Public " ' 
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
4^ 
I hereby certify that on the rQi/ day of December, 
1992, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. BROADBENT to the 
following: 
Gordon Madsen, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, UT 84054 
and telecopied a copy to him at 298-9460. 
momtmr M. YCATCS 
DAVID ft. O C t O X * H L C » 
0€**tS R. M © » » * L L 
JON C. MCATOK 
J O H N P. AftMTON 
RONALD r. SYSAK 
WlCHAHO L. » L A N C * 
JONN M. » H A O L C r 
O. JAY G * M * t - E 
C. C«AIO L»t-JCNOUf5T 
j . N A N D A U CAUL 
JOHN S. CMtNOLUNO 
•WILLIAM A. M t * D E « S . J * 
O e © r r » C Y w. M A N C U M 
J A M C I A. » O t V t » f 
R O N A L D C N C M M I N C 
D*V?D K. t»CUO»IWT 
T H O M A S J . C W R I N 
ftAMUCL ALBA 
M. DAVID CCKC»»LCY 
* O R E » T C W I N G 
C A * L W . » A W T O N 
T H O M A S M . M E L T O N 
G W C G O W Y t . L iNDLCr 
DON « . SCMOw 
SALLV SUCK M*MINlMEE 
» O G E « J . M « C O N * l £ 
CWAIG J . W A N G t O A V O 
P R I N C E , YEATES & G E L D Z A H L E R 
A RROrESSlONAL CO»»0«AT»ON 
L A W Y E R S 
CITY CENTRE I , SUITE 9 0 0 
175 EAST FOURTH SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 6-4III 
TELEPHONE (BOI) 52-4-IOOO 
June 5, 1992 
RARK C»TY o r r i c c 
6 » « M A I N S T R E E T 
P. O. BOX 3 6 
R A R K C I T Y , U T A H M O f i O 
(SOI) 6 4 9 7 4 4 0 
OF COUNSEL 
LTLE M. W A * D 
T E L E C O P I E R 
<SOt) 5 2 * * l O » 9 
r. s . M I N C E ( i e i o - i © » i ) 
-lie5 "A" 
HAND DELIVERED 
Robert C. Cummings 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Covington v. John C. Josephson - Property Taxes 
Dear Bob: 
As I mentioned to you during our recent telephone 
conversation, the Covingtons were required to pay the 
Josephson's property taxes on May 12, 1992 in order to conclude 
the sale of the Covington property. That payment, in the 
amount of $3,377.15, was required in order to clear the tax 
liens from their property. Copies of the receipt and 
redemption certificates are included with this letter. In 
addition to taxes, the Josephsons still owe for water share 
assessments from 1987 to the present. These amounts are as 
follows: 
The 1987 assessment of $2.15 per share was paid on 
November 30, 1987, totalling $11.25 for the Josephson's five 
shares. Interest on this amount through June 6, 1992 is $5.09. 
The 1988 assessment was paid January 19, 1989, in the 
amount of $23.75, or $4.75 per share. Interest to June 6, 1992 
is $8.03. 
>^CE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Robert C. Curoraings 
June 5, 1992 
Page 2 
The 1989 assessment was paid March 15, 1990 in the 
amount of $24.05 at the rate of $4.81 per share. Interest to 
June 6, 1992 is $5.36. 
The 1990 assessment was paid February 25, 1991 at the 
rate of $4.50 per share for a total of $22.50. Interest to 
June 6, 1992 is $2.88. 
These amounts, including interest at the statutory 
contract rate of 10% per year total $102.91 as of June 6, 1992. 
The Covingtons feel that they have given ample time to 
the Josephsons to arrange to take care of this matter, and that 
because the Josephsons have not done so, the Covingtons have 
been forced to pay the taxes themselves and now obtain 
reimbursement from the Josephsons. 
Please contact me as soon as possible to arrange for 
payment. 
Sincerely, 
DKB:pn 
Enclosure 
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SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH B4111 
rt ZL (J L i % c v 
TELEPHONE 
(801)322-1141 
Ms. Sally McMinimee 
Mr. David Broadbent 
Attorneys at Law 
175 East 4th South #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
nr^ii 
RE: Mr. J o h n J o s e p h s o n 
EXH!BiT."B 
Dear Sally and David: 
I spoke with John and told him that the figures on the taxes were 
coming. I also forwarded to him DayeJ^s letter outlining the 
amounts, but I find that John is/^u^of town for a few weeks. I 
will make contact as soon as I can and get back to you. 
Thank you. 
V e r y t r u l y " tfours, 
ROBERT/^. CUMMINGS 
j a 
6F 
Gordon A. Madsen #2048 
Attorney for Defendants 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
Telephone: (801) 298-6610 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 'CIRCUIT C0UR# OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B. 
COVINGTON, by and through it's 
Co-Personal Representatives, 
Robert H. Covington and Mary 
C. Wheaton, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. and GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFFS/EMOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil/fjo. 92 000943 6CV 
Judge: Robin W. Reese 
) 
) ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
JOHN C. JOSEPHSON, upon his oath deposes and says: 
1. That I am one of the Defendants named in the above-
entitled action, and aver the facts set out below from my own 
direct knowledge. 
2. That I fully performed my duties under the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract referred to in Plaintiffs' Complaint, making 
the final payment May 18, 1989 as demonstrated by the attached 
statement of Draper Bank, marked Exhibit nAn and incorporated 
herein by reference as though set out in full. 
3. The Third District court in the case involving the 
same Plaintiffs and Defendants, Civil No. C-89-3339, Judge Richard 
EXHIBIT "HM 
H. Moffat, presiding, in its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law, stated at Finding #6. 
"The Uniform Real Estate Contract has been paid in 
full." 
A copy of the court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law are 
attached hereto, marked Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by 
reference as though set out in full. 
4. While those Findings and the Judgment attached to 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum make it obvious, I further state that my 
Answer filed in that action alleged full performance of the 
contract by me, and Plaintiffs' Reply denied such performance, and 
that issue was directly tried by the District court, giving rise to 
the above-quoted Finding. 
Subscribed and sworn to Defore me, a Notary Public this 
16th day of October, 1992. 
r;o*r^\f PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH 
My Commission Expires 
August 3,1996 
KIMBERLY WRIGHT 
147 North 200 Wwt 
Sail UkeCtfy.Uah 34103 
Out 
5TARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
My commission expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Affidavit 
to David K. Broadbent and Thomas M. Melton, attorneys for 
Plaintiffs, at their address, City Centre I, Suite 900, 175 East 
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 16th day of October, 
1992. 
NO. 
Buyer_ John C Josephson 
8560 Danish Rd 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
942-3338 
D R A P E R / ^ 
D«tA»f« WT»W Sellers Douglas B Covington 
8500 Danish Rd 
s&ftdy, Utah—84070 
Contract Amount 
Unpaid Balance 
Interest 
Date of Contract 
Interest From 
13, 830.00 
8% 
Payment 110.00 
Escrow . 
S/C Buyer. 
Checking 82-00748-5 
Savings 
C/C At:. 
Principal 
& Interest . 
At, 
Seller. 5.00 
105.00 
OTHER DISBURSEMENT: 
5 days^ctiarge 5\ OO^lafe charge 
ACCOUNT NO. 
)ATE PAYMENT ESCROW INTEREST AMOUNT PAID TO S/C 
TAX* 
INSURANCE MISC PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
-9-87 
-15-81 
-11-87 
0-1-8 
-28-8' 
460.00 
575.00 
230.00 
225.00 
110.00 
1-88 
-88 
L5-88 
•1-88 
-27-881 
225.06 
345.00 
225.00 
230.00 
455.00 
2-89 
8-89 
d in 
220.00 
97.79 
t u l l 
79.19 
86.75 
28.40 
25.72 
11.53_ 
21.82 
28.77 
15.15 
12.42 
19.32 
2-10-87 
7-10- 8 
9-10-87 
11-101 
12-10-8 
late 15.00 
late J 
h87 
late 
2.02 
1.90 
3-10-88 
5-10-88 
7-10-88 
9-10-88 
1-10-89 
2-10-89 
5-18-89 
late 5 
late 
late 5 J 
late 1 
late 151 
10.00 closing fee 
^O ^7C/g,y "Jft 
5.00 
365.18 
473.25 
201.60 
2603.99 
2130.74 
1929.14 
1729.86 
1636.39 
1438.21 
1136.98 
932.13 
724.55 
303.87 
f 
217^8 
89 
85.8 §0 
i / 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
David K. Broadbent (0442) 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
The Estate of DOUGLAS B. 
COVINGTON, by and through its 
Co-Personal Representatives, 
Robert H. Covington and 
Mary C. Whetman, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. and GERALDINE C. 
JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Civil No. 920009436CV 
Judge Robin W. Reese 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DAVID K. BROADBENT, having been first duly sworn and 
put under oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Since 1979, I have been a member in good standing 
of the Utah State Bar and admitted to practice before all state 
and federal courts in the State of Utah. I am a shareholder in 
the law firm of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler and have represented 
EXHIBIT 
the plaintiff in this action and, as such, I have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit. 
2. I have been responsible for conducting this 
litigation on behalf of the plaintiff, and I am familiar with the 
legal services that have been performed on their behalf. Those 
legal services have been performed by me and others working 
directly with me. 
3. Attached hereto and incorporated herein is a 
detailed itemization of the specific legal services performed by 
the law firm of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler with regard to this 
matter, and only this matter, as of January 4, 1993. The 
itemization reflects the attorney or paralegal performing those 
legal services, the time spent, their hourly rate, the nature of 
the services provided, and the cost to the plaintiff. As 
detailed in the attached schedule, our services included the 
obtaining of information about the claims and defenses from our 
client and other sources, analyzing the claims and defenses, 
preparing the necessary summons and complaint, researching legal 
issues, preparing our motion for summary judgment and 
accompanying memorandum, preparing memorandum and affidavits to 
respond to defendants' motion for summary judgment, and arguing 
the matter to the Court. 
-2-
4. The plaintiff has incurred court costs in the 
amount of $131.40 and legal fees in the amount of $3,127.50 in 
litigating this matter. The billing rates for the attorneys and 
the paralegal involved in these matters are reasonable for the 
type of work performed, and the amount of time and effort 
expended in pursuing this matter was reasonable and prudently 
required in order to fairly present the plaintiff's case to the 
Court. 
5. I am familiar with the attorneys' fees and costs 
charged by attorneys in Salt Lake City, Utah for legal services 
of this kind, and in my opinion the services described above, and 
the fees and costs charged therefor, are reasonable. 
DATED this £j*r day of January, 1993. 
DAVID K. BROADBENT 
,^r 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ^J?/ day of 
January, 1993. 
J»'cte7 P'.:b!:c "1 
v- 'K^y 
NOTARY PUBLIC / ^ 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
[JJ^eb i imi iss^or^x^ i i res :J 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that, on the r^h^ day of January, 
1993, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees to the 
following: 
Gordon A. Madsen, Esq, 
Attorney at Law 
1130 West Center Street 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
<<J2J 
-4 
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ATTACHMENT TO AFFIDAVIT FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Calculation of Fees and Costs 
FEES: 
DATE NAME TIME AMOUNT DESCRIPTION 
05/13/92 DKB* .30 $ 42.00 Telephone conferences with 
Robert Covington re payment of 
Josephson's property taxes and 
assessments at sale of property, 
discuss reimbursement issues 
05/19/92 DKB .20 28.00 Conference with client; review 
tax calculations 
06/05/92 DKB .60 84.00 Prepare calculations; telephone 
conference with Bob Covington; 
telephone conference with Bob 
Cummings, attorney for 
Josephson, prepare letter to 
Cummings 
06/29/92 DKB .30 42.00 Telephone conference with Robert 
Covington; review letter from 
Cummings; meet with Tom Melton 
regarding commencing litigation 
Review contract and 
correspondence re complaint for 
reimbursement of taxes paid 
Review claims, draft complaint 
Draft complaint 
Draft complaint & summons, 
arrange for service 
Conference with Tom Melton re 
preparation of motion for 
summary j udgment, review 
pleadings and claims regarding 
summary judgment motion and memo 
09/03/92 LP .50 25.00 Review pleadings, prepare motion 
for summary judgment 
09/08/92 LP 5.70 285.00 prepare summary judgment motion; 
draft memorandum in support and 
research legal issues 
06/29/92 
07/01/92 
07/03/92 
07/06/92 
09/01/92 
TMM* 
TMM 
TMM 
TMM 
LP* 
1.00 
.50 
1.20 
.20 
.50 
110.00 
55.00 
132.00 
22.00 
25.00 
DATE NAME TIME AMOUNT DESCRIPTION 
09/09/92 LP 6,90 345,00 Research re summary judgment and 
draft same re res judicata 
issues and breach of contract 
claim; edit/revise motion 
09/15/92 LP 6.10 305.00 Finalize morion and supporting 
memorandum for summary judgment; 
conference with Tom Melton re 
same 
09/23/92 TMM 2.00 220.00 Revise motion and memo of 
summary judgment. Conference 
with Lisa Peck re same 
09/23/92 LP .30 15.00 Review of summary judgment memo; 
conference with Tom Melton re 
revisions to same 
09/24/92 LP .50 25.00 Revise memo in support for 
summary judgment 
12/29/92 DKB 4.8 672.00 review pleadings from prior 
litigation re res judicata 
issue, review defendant's 
response memorandum and 
affidavits, prepare memorandum 
in opposition to defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, 
prepare affidavits, 40 Bob 
Cummings re possible testimony, 
review closing statement re 
taxes paid at closing, review 
tax notices and calculation of 
taxes due, meet with Mary 
Whetman regarding her affidavit 
and discussions with title 
company re payment of taxes and 
assessments, prepare for hearing 
12/30/92 DKB .6 84.00 review depositions, prepare 
affidavits, prepare for hearing 
01/4/93 DKB 1.9 266.00 prepare for hearing, argue 
motion for summary judgment 
01/07/93 KF* .60 31.20 Conference/meeting with David 
Broadbent; review file, 
pleadings, memo from David 
Broadbent and records re 
attorneys fees and costs 
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DATE NAME TIME AMOUNT 
01/08/93 KF 2.00 104.00 
01/08/93 DKB 1.50 210.00 
DESCRIPTION 
Drafting Order and Judgment, 
obtain information for and 
prepare draft of Affidavit of 
Attorneys' Fees 
review and revise order and 
judgment, edit affidavit of 
attorneys fees 
FEE TOTALS $3,127.50 
* Attorneys: 
DKB — David K. Broadbent, hourly rate: $140.00 
TMM — Thomas M. Melton, hourly rate: $110.00 
LP — Lisa Peck, hourly rate: $50.00 
Paralegal: 
KF — Karen Fisher, hourly rate $52.00 
COSTS: 
Filing Fee 
Constable Fees for Service 
Photocopies 
TOTAL COSTS 
$ 40.00 
71.00 
20.40 
$131.40 
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